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Abstract
This article proposes a new rationale for consumer search and mixed-strategy pricing: the
presence of local market heterogeneities. In the model, two spatially separated markets, each
home to an identical local monopolist, diﬀer in size and their consumers' willingness to pay (e.g.,
as caused by diﬀerences in local income). Consumers observe their native market's price and
a ﬂexible subset of them may travel to the other market at strictly positive cost, hoping for a
bargain. I show that as long as the proportion of ﬂexible consumers in the high-valuation market
is not too large, directed search to the low-valuation market will occur in equilibrium. If the high-
valuation market is relatively large in size, the opposed ﬁrm faces a commitment problem that
induces non-trivial mixed-strategy pricing in equilibrium. In particular, low-valuation consumers
are excluded from the product market with positive probability. Informative advertising with
price-commitment may decrease market performance.
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1 Introduction
It is a well-established empirical ﬁnding that the law of one price is no law at all (Varian
(1980)): prices for homogeneous products are often widely dispersed.1 A prominent explanation
is that consumers cannot freely observe product prices across competing ﬁrms. Instead, obtaining
additional price information is costly, and consumers have to search actively across sellers in
order to ﬁnd a good deal. This informational imperfection provides ﬁrms with market power and
enables them to raise prices above marginal cost.
Unfortunately, the famous Diamond paradox (1971) establishes that if all (identical) con-
sumers ﬁnd it costly to compare prices (no matter how small these costs are), consumers search
sequentially, and ﬁrms as well as the initial consumer distribution across them are symmetric,
the unique equilibrium entails monopoly-pricing by all ﬁrms, while no consumers search.2
Since Diamond's seminal contribution, numerous attempts have been made to overcome this
counterfactual theoretical prediction. In the here considered framework of sequential consumer
search for homogeneous products, the vast majority of models introduce a positive mass of
consumers without search costs (shoppers) who observe all prices in the market, and thus put
a downward pressure on prices.3 Examples include the celebrated paper by Stahl (1989) on
costly sequential search in oligopoly, as well as modiﬁcations allowing for heterogeneity across
consumers with positive search costs (Stahl (1996)), or truly costly sequential search (Janssen
et al. (2005)). However, in reality, it is far from clear whether a group of consumers exists that
does not face any costs of obtaining additional price information (let alone, costs of visiting
additional shops or spending more time on search).
A further drawback of most contemporaneous sequential-search models is that no proper
search occurs in equilibrium. This is because an endogenous reservation price emerges above
which consumers with positive search cost would prefer to visit another ﬁrm. But then, unless
further ingredients are added, no ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to price above this reservation price in
equilibrium, as doing so implies zero demand.4
1See Baye et al. (2006) for a detailed survey of theoretical and empirical studies on price dispersion in
homogeneous-goods markets.
2The reason is straightforward: Suppose to the contrary that not all ﬁrms price at the monopoly level pm.
Since pricing above the monopoly price is clearly suboptimal, the ﬁrm(s) with the lowest price in the market must
price strictly below pm. But this cannot be part of an equilibrium, because slightly increasing this lowest price
towards the monopoly level does not lead any consumers to purchase elsewhere, as they face a strictly positive
search cost.
3One exception is Reinganum (1979), who generates price dispersion by marginal-cost diﬀerences across a
continuum of ﬁrms, with consumers having downward-sloping demand.
4In Stahl (1996) and Chen and Zhang (2011), search-cost heterogeneities across consumers with positive
search costs may lead some consumers to search actively in equilibrium. However, both models require an atom
of shoppers in order to generate price dispersion.
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Finally, a typical feature of standard search models is that search (or hypothetical search, if
it never occurs in equilibrium) is undirected. This means that even after rejecting a high price
and moving on, the next ﬁrm a consumer samples is drawn randomly from a set of ﬁrms with
identical characteristics. Hence, these models do not allow for directed search towards ﬁrms that
are perceived to oﬀer particularly good deals in expectation, i.e., discounters.5
The present paper addresses the above issues by introducing search across locally separated
and heterogeneous submarkets. Particular features of the model are that (i) all consumers have
positive search costs, yet equilibria arise where not all ﬁrms price at the monopoly level (ii) there
may be proper search in equilibrium, and (iii) search is directed towards a ﬁrm that is perceived
as discounter and does in fact oﬀer lower prices in expectation.
The general mechanism that leads to search in the model is straightforward, robust, and,
to the best of my knowledge, has not been pointed out by the theoretical literature. The key
idea is to consider locally separated monopolistic markets which, due to either demand-side or
supply-side heterogeneities, would give rise to diﬀerent monopoly prices in isolation. However,
there is a link between the markets in the sense that some ﬂexible consumers may, given their
beliefs about the other market's unobserved price, ﬁnd it worthwhile to travel to this market at
strictly positive cost.
One can then conjecture that an equilibrium exists in which the local monopolists cater
to diﬀerent consumer groups. While the ﬁrm in the market with the higher monopoly price
(henceforth called regular ﬁrm) focuses on exploiting a captive segment of local consumers,
its rival in the market with the lower monopoly price (henceforth called discounter) charges a
lower price which attracts the outside market's ﬂexible consumers and is optimal given its local
market's characteristics (including incoming consumers).
In the main model that I develop below, I formalize this intuition by focusing on the case of
demand-side heterogeneities. For tractability, I assume that all consumers have unit demand up
to a maximal valuation, but that this valuation is higher in one market than the other. While
stylized, there are various real-world market conﬁgurations which share similar features. For
example, many empirical studies document that income tends to be highly segregated in urban
5Arbatskaya (2007) considers the implications of search in a homogeneous-product market where consumers
with heterogeneous search costs have to follow an exogenous search order. Under certain conditions, such markets
exhibit a unique equilibrium in pure strategies in which prices are strictly declining in the search order, and active
search occurs in equilibrium. Besides speciﬁc physical constraints (e.g., the line-up of vendors in an Oriental
bazaar), it is not clear why consumers should not upset this equilibrium by visiting the last ﬁrm in the search
order ﬁrst.
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areas  the rich rarely locate door-to-door with the poor.6 It is then natural to think that the
poor will have a lower maximum willingness to pay for certain products, and that ﬁrms located
in poor neighborhoods will have to put a lower price tag on these products if they want to avoid
excluding their local population from buying.7 Alternatively, the setup may reﬂect a situation
of cross-border shopping that is induced by diﬀerences in income or favorable exchange rates.
In continental Europe, cross-border shopping has a long history, and is still observed frequently
(see e.g. Swiss Shoppers Storm German Border Towns, Spiegel Online, 2011).8
Analyzing the described market conﬁguration, the following main results are shown. First,
if a large fraction of consumers in the high-valuation market is ﬂexible, paradoxically no search
occurs in the unique equilibrium of the game. This is because the regular ﬁrm in the high-
valuation market ﬁnds its local ﬂexible consumers too important to lose, and optimally charges
a suﬃciently low price that discourages them from leaving.
Second, if the fraction of ﬂexible consumers in the high-valuation market is suﬃciently small
and at the same time the high-valuation market is not too large relative to the low-valuation one,
the unique equilibrium of the game follows the intuition from above: the regular ﬁrm charges
the high monopoly price, the discounter charges the low one, and the high-valuation market's
ﬂexible consumers travel to the low-valuation market and purchase there with certainty. The
discounter has no incentive to increase its price, as this would drive out its local consumers with
a lower willingness to pay. At the same time, the regular ﬁrm has no incentive to discourage its
local ﬂexible consumers from search, as it would have to decrease its price by too much.
Third, if the high-valuation market is large relative to the low-valuation market (and the
proportion of ﬂexible consumers in the former is not too high), the discounter faces a commitment
problem. While the discounter would like the ﬂexible high-valuation consumers to believe that
it charges a low price and therefore induce search, the expected incoming mass of ﬂexible high-
valuation consumers would be so large that the discounter would prefer to maximally exploit
these searching consumers by (almost) charging the price of its rival, despite driving out its
local consumers. But clearly, this cannot constitute an equilibrium, as then the high-valuation
market's ﬂexible consumers would have no incentive to search in the ﬁrst place.
6See e.g. Bischoﬀ and Reardon (2013) and Florida and Mellander (2015) for recent reports on income segre-
gation in major U.S. metropolitan areas.
7Even in the absence of income diﬀerences, the population's composition may vary considerably across regions.
In turn, diﬀerences in willingness to pay for an identical product may prevail.
8A relatively recent survey of the vast economic literature on cross-border shopping is given by Leal et al.
(2010).
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It turns out that the discounter's commitment problem can only be resolved by mixed-strategy
pricing in which the ﬁrm sometimes prices above its local consumers' valuation, but also some-
times does not sell at all because it is priced out by its rival. The latter occurs because with
positive probability, the regular ﬁrm engages in a sale that may beat the discounter's price, at
least if the latter tries to exploit the incoming searchers by pricing above its local monopoly price.
Moreover, if the discounter's commitment problem is severe enough, in the unique corresponding
equilibrium the regular ﬁrm sometimes engages in a deep sale, which altogether discourages its
local ﬂexible consumers from search (thus further reducing the discounter's incentive to price
above its local consumers' valuation).
Following up on these observations, it is worthwhile to point out that, to the best of my
knowledge, my model is the ﬁrst which can generate both spatial and temporal price dispersion
in equilibrium. The price dispersion is spatial, in the sense of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) and
Reinganum (1979), because the discount ﬁrm charges prices that are on average lower than the
regular ﬁrm's. On the other hand, if the discounter faces a commitment problem, the price
dispersion is also temporal, in the sense of e.g. Shilony (1977), Varian (1980) and Rosenthal
(1980), because in equilibrium, both ﬁrms sample prices from overlapping supports. Hence,
complex sales patterns arise in which the regular ﬁrm sometimes engages in promotions which
beat the discounter's price, or altogether discourage its local ﬂexible consumers from shopping
around.
After discussing the diﬀerent types of equilibria that arise in the model, I turn to a social-
welfare analysis. I identify two potential sources of welfare loss in the market: wasteful travel
expenditures undertaken by searching high-valuation consumers, and deadweight loss created
by dropout low-valuation consumers. While the former occurs whenever the fraction of ﬂexi-
ble high-valuation consumers is not too large (otherwise, the regular ﬁrm ﬁghts for its ﬂexible
consumers and the social ﬁrst-best is achieved), the latter only occurs if the discounter faces a
commitment problem. In that case, the ﬁrm prices above its local consumers' valuation with
positive probability in equilibrium.
The latter phenomenon also endogenizes an empirical regularity that has widely been doc-
umented, namely that poorer consumer groups tend to ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to access product
markets (see e.g. Somekh (2012, 2015) and the references therein). In my model, I ﬁnd that, if
the high-valuation (high-income) market is relatively large in size, the ﬁrm in the low-valuation
(low-income) market may consider it optimal to (probabilistically) exclude its local consumers
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from purchasing. This is because higher rents can be extracted from less price sensitive (or more
wealthy) shoppers coming from outside.
Comparative statics with respect to social welfare (and other equilibrium objects like the
ﬁrms' pricing strategies and proﬁts) are provided. Often, the sign of marginal eﬀects changes after
transitions between the diﬀerent equilibrium regions. Moreover, in some cases, countervailing
eﬀects are at play which may lead to non-monotonicities within equilibrium regions. For example,
if the discounter faces a moderate commitment problem, an increase in the fraction of ﬂexible
consumers in the high-valuation market unambiguously increases the aggregate search friction
that is incurred, but may at the same time decrease the probability that the discounter prices
above its local consumers' valuation in equilibrium, reducing expected deadweight loss. Which
eﬀect dominates depends on the exact parameter constellation.
Finally, in the most important extension of the baseline model, I study the eﬀects of in-
formative advertising on ﬁrms' equilibrium behavior. In particular, I investigate whether the
discounter's commitment problem is mitigated if it can perfectly advertise (and thereby, commit
to) a deterministic price at small but positive advertising cost. Somewhat surprisingly, it turns
out that costly advertising may often cause more harm than good. In particular, conditions
are identiﬁed under which (i) the discounter advertises a price lower than its local consumers'
valuation, thereby discouraging the regular ﬁrm from pricing aggressively and inducing wasteful
search behavior, and (ii) the discounter advertises a price higher than its local consumers' val-
uation, leading all of its local consumers to drop out of the market deterministically. The only
case where informative advertising and price-commitment by the discounter is privately optimal
and may enhance social welfare is if the ﬁrm faces a severe commitment problem, but ﬁnds it
optimal to price-advertise its local consumers' valuation. On the other hand, if the ﬁrm faces
a moderate commitment problem, it never ﬁnds it optimal to engage in costly advertising, but
this would be welfare-improving in those cases where the ﬁrm's advertising cost is not too high.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The paragraph below discusses related
literature in more detail. In Section 2, the model setup is introduced. The diﬀerent equilibria of
the baseline game are analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 is concerned with social welfare. Compar-
ative statics with respect to several equilibrium objects are provided in Section 5. An extension
to costly advertising and price-commitment is outlined in Section 6. Section 7 demonstrates
that the principal mechanism which leads to search and price dispersion also extends to the case
of supply-side heterogeneities. Section 8 concludes and points out some potential directions for
future research. Technical proofs, mostly related to existence of the characterized equilibria, are
relegated to Appendix A. Online Appendix B establishes uniqueness of these equilibria.
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Related Literature
This article closely relates to research on price dispersion and consumer search under asymmetric
market conﬁgurations. An important early contribution was given by Narasimhan (1988), who
extends Varian's (1980) classic model of sales (where ﬁrms have symmetric loyal consumer bases,
and compete in prices for a perfectly price-sensitive mass of shoppers) to the case of asymmetric
shares of loyal consumers across (duopolistic) ﬁrms. However, in contrast to the present work,
(sequential) search is ruled out, as consumers are either perfectly informed about all prices, or
are fully captive to their preferred ﬁrm. The rationale for price dispersion thus diﬀers greatly
from the showcased model.9
More similar in spirit is a recent paper by Astorne-Figari and Yankelevich (2014), who con-
sider a setup in which duopolistic competitors diﬀer in their number of local (captive) con-
sumers.10 As in my model, these consumers do not directly observe the price of the outside
ﬁrm, but may obtain this information at positive cost. The authors show that in the unique
equilibrium of this game, both ﬁrms play mixed strategies, but the price distribution of the ﬁrm
with the larger mass of local consumers ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the one of its rival.
The major diﬀerence between their model and the present work is that price dispersion is driven
by an atom of shoppers, rather than by local market diﬀerences. Proper search does not occur
in equilibrium, and eliminating the atom of shoppers leads to the Diamond result. Moreover,
the ﬁrm with lower average prices cannot face a commitment problem, as non-local consumers
with positive search cost never visit it.
Other related papers that explicitly account for market asymmetries in a search framework
are given by Burdett and Smith (2010) and Kuniavsky (2014). In Burdett and Smith (2010),
one dominant ﬁrm with a continuum of retail outlets competes with a fringe mass of atomistic
sellers, and consumers employ a noisy search technology in the spirit of Burdett and Judd
(1983). Kuniavsky (2014) extends the standard sequential search model of Stahl (1989) to allow
for heterogeneously sized sellers (where sellers with more outlets have a higher probability of
being sampled ﬁrst). In both of these papers, price dispersion is driven by diﬀerent forces than
in the present model. In particular, directed search to a perceived discount store, which tends
to oﬀer lower prices due to local market characteristics, does not occur.
9An interesting follow-up paper by Deneckere et al. (1992) contrasts the equilibrium of Narasimhan (1988)
with the case of exogenous and endogenous price-leadership by one of the ﬁrms in the model. Some of their results
under price-leadership resemble those of the present paper's section on informative advertising.
10See also Astorne-Figari and Yankelevich (2011) for a more detailed, earlier working paper version.
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Since all consumers in my model face positive search costs, yet prices are dispersed in equilib-
rium, the paper also relates to a small literature on resolving the Diamond paradox under strictly
positive search costs. Examples include Bagwell and Ramey (1992), who resolve the paradox by
consumers making repeat purchases, and Rhodes (2014), who avoids the problem by considering
multi-product retailers.
The model extension to informative advertising of Section 6 is connected to a growing liter-
ature on the interplay of consumer search and advertising, e.g. as given by Robert and Stahl
(1993), Janssen and Non (2008), and Janssen and Non (2009).11 Most closely related is the work
by Bester and Petrakis (1995), who analyze costly advertising by locally separated duopolists.
However, due to their perfectly symmetric conﬁguration with identical local consumer popula-
tions and market sizes, advertising is never undertaken to resolve a ﬁrm's commitment problem
of charging low prices.12
Finally, an older strand of literature combines location models in the spirit of Hotelling (1929)
with imperfectly informed consumers (see, e.g, Gabszewicz and Garella (1986, 1987)). From
today's perspective, the search technology and equilibrium concepts used in these models are
non-standard (e.g., consumers initially know the average price in the market, while their beliefs
about unobserved prices need not be correct in equilibrium), and an important focus lies on
establishing conditions for equilibrium existence in pure pricing-strategies. The main mechanism
for search that is portrayed in this paper, the presence of local market heterogeneities, is not
explicitly considered.
2 Model Setup
Consider the following market. There are two spatially separated local submarkets H (high
valuation) and L (low valuation) that host one risk-neutral ﬁrm each, labeled and indexed by
their locations. The ﬁrms compete in prices pH , pL and sell a single homogeneous product that
is oﬀered in their respective market only. The ﬁrms' identical, constant unit costs are normalized
to zero.
A total mass α ∈ (0, 1) of consumers live in H, whereas the remaining mass 1− α live in L.
The consumers' valuations for the homogeneous product are identical within the local markets.
11See also Butters (1977) for a seminal contribution on informative advertising, albeit without allowing for
(active) consumer search.
12Under diﬀerent setups, the role of advertising as commitment device to resolve the Diamond paradox has
been analyzed. A useful discussion can be found in Anderson and Renault (2006).
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That is, all consumers that live in H have unit demand up to a maximum valuation of vH ,
whereas all consumers that live in L have unit demand up to a lower maximum valuation of
vL < vH .
In the baseline model, each consumer only observes the price posted by the ﬁrm in her
home market. However, some consumers are ﬂexible in the sense that they can travel to the
other market at positive cost, purchasing there if the observed price is lower. For expositional
simplicity, assume that the L-market consumers are fully captive in the sense that they will
never visit H.13 Given pL, they either buy directly (if pL ≤ vL), or not at all. In contrast, some
consumers in H have the possibility to search. Being heterogeneous with respect to their search
behavior, a fraction 1− β of H-consumers is captive as well. Given pH , they either buy directly
(if pH ≤ vH), or not at all. On the other hand, a fraction β of H-consumers are (potential)
searchers: at a travel cost s ∈ (0, vH − vL),14 they can visit market L and return, purchasing
on the way if the observed price is lower. In all of what follows, I will refer to these potentially
searching consumers as ﬂexible H-consumers. Note that in the model, searching consumers have
to return to their home market after observing the other ﬁrm's price. While intuitive, this setup
is also consistent with the usual assumption of free recall in search models.
For the formal analysis, it is moreover necessary to specify the following tie-breaking rules:
(i) if ﬂexible H-consumers observe a price pH that keeps them indiﬀerent between visiting L, or
buying directly (given their beliefs about L's pricing), they will buy directly at H (ii) if ﬂexible
H-consumers who indeed search observe a price pL that is equal to pH , they buy on the way at
L.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, ﬁrms H and L simultaneously choose their
prices pH and pL which are then ﬁxed for the rest of the game. Second, each consumer observes
her home market's price, and all captive consumers buy immediately as long as the observed
price does not exceed their valuation. Third, the mass αβ ﬂexible H-consumers observe pH and
decide whether to visit L or not, given their beliefs and travel cost s. If not, they purchase at H,
provided that pH ≤ vH . If they visit the L-market, they incur the travel cost s, observe L's price,
and optimally buy at the cheaper ﬁrm (given that its price does not exceed their valuation).
13This assumption does not aﬀect any of the results and is only made to streamline the model setup. In
Lemma 2 in Appendix A, I show that as long as there is no positive mass of L-consumers with zero travel costs,
L-consumers will never search in equilibrium, irrespective of their search-cost distribution.
14For s ≥ vH − vL, the unique equilibrium of the game is given by the uninteresting case in which H prices at
vH , L prices at vL, and no consumers search.
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L H
mass α consumers
mass 1− α consumers
valuation vL each
valuation vH > vL each
travel cost s ∈ (0, vH − vL)
price pL price pH
L’s price unobserved for αβ
αβ
flexible H-consumers
α(1− β) captive consumers
Figure 1: Depiction of the analyzed market.
In the next section, I will solve for the equilibrium of the described game given the parameters
vH , vL, α, β, and s.
15 Note that since this is a game of imperfect information, the αβ ﬂexible
H-consumers will have to form beliefs about L's unobserved price in order to make their search
decision. I restrict these consumers' out-of-equilibrium beliefs when observing an oﬀ-equilibrium
price pH that is never played in equilibrium in such a way that their beliefs about L's pricing are
not aﬀected (passive beliefs). As is usual, the ﬂexible H-consumers' beliefs need to be correct in
equilibrium.
Figure 1 provides a graphical summary of the described market structure.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
The game's diﬀerent types of equilibria are characterized by the following sequence of proposi-
tions. Uniqueness is established in Online Appendix B.
Proposition 1. If β > β := 1 − vL+svH ∈ (0, 1), the unique equilibrium of the game is in pure
strategies such that p∗H = vL + s ∈ (vL, vH), p∗L = vL, and all αβ ﬂexible H-consumers purchase
in H. H's equilibrium proﬁt is given by Π∗H = (vL + s)α, whereas L's equilibrium proﬁt is given
by Π∗L = vL(1− α).
Proof. (Existence) The proposed equilibrium implies the above ﬁrm proﬁts of Π∗H and Π
∗
L, as
can easily be calculated. Clearly, given that H prices at vL + s and the ﬂexible H-consumers do
not search, L can do not better than to price at vL (as pricing higher than vL would induce all L-
consumers to exit the market, and pricing lower than vL induces no search, as it is unobserved by
15Clearly, either vH , vL or s can be normalized to some arbitrary constant, e.g., vH = 1 (such that vL and s
can be expressed as fractions of vH). For expositional reasons (and in order to allow for comparative statics with
respect to vH), I will not do so throughout the paper.
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the ﬂexible H-consumers). On the other hand, H's best possible deviation is to increase its price
to vH , lose all αβ ﬂexible H-consumers, but fully exploit its captive consumers. This gives rise
to a maximal deviation proﬁt of Πdev
∗
H = vHα(1− β). It is easy to check that β > β := 1− vL+svH
implies Πdev
∗
H < Π
∗
H .
Example 1. Let vH = 200, vL = 100, s = 10.
16 It immediately follows that β = 0.45. Hence, for
β > 0.45, no matter what α, the unique equilibrium of the game (given the speciﬁed vH , vL and
s) is such that p∗L = 100, p
∗
H = 110, and no consumers search. This gives rise to deterministic
ﬁrm proﬁts of Π∗L = 100(1− α) and Π∗H = 110α.
The intuition to Proposition 1 is straightforward: if suﬃciently many H-consumers are ﬂex-
ible, H ﬁnds it worthwhile to ﬁght for these consumers and discourage them from search. The
optimal way for H to achieve this is by charging the maximal markup over L's price which deters
the ﬂexible H-consumers from search: p∗L + s. Note moreover that p
∗
L < vL cannot be part of an
equilibrium. If it was, H would either ﬁnd it optimal to charge p∗L + s < vH (if p
∗
L is suﬃciently
close to vL) or the highest possible price vH (if p
∗
L is small). In either case, L could achieve a
higher proﬁt by increasing its price a little, as this would not decrease its demand. Hence, for a
large β, the only possible equilibrium is such that p∗L = vL, p
∗
H = vL + s, and no search occurs.
Proposition 2. If β < β and α ≤ α(β) := vLβ(vH−vL)+vL ∈ (αmin, 1), where αmin = vHvLv2H−(vL+s)(vH−vL) ∈
(0, 1), the unique equilibrium of the game is in pure strategies such that p∗∗H = vH , p
∗∗
L = vL,
and all αβ ﬂexible H-consumers search and purchase in L.17 H's equilibrium proﬁt is given by
Π∗∗H = vHα(1− β), whereas L's equilibrium proﬁt is given by Π∗∗L = vL(1− α+ αβ).
Proof. (Existence) The proposed equilibrium implies the above ﬁrm proﬁts of Π∗∗H and Π
∗∗
L , as
can easily be calculated. From each ﬁrm's perspective, there is a unique optimal deviation to
this. First, H can reduce its price to vL+s, discourage the αβ ﬂexible H-consumers from leaving,
and make an optimal deviation proﬁt of Πdev
∗∗
H = (vL + s)α. However, by the reverse logic of
Proposition 1, this is not proﬁtable if β < β. Second, L can increase its price to vH , lose all
16In order to allow for a meaningful comparison of equilibria, this parameter combination will be used in most
subsequent examples (for varying values of α and β). It should be noted though that as long as s < vH − vL, for
any triplet (vH , vL, s), all diﬀerent types of equilibria can be found in (α, β) space.
17In the zero-measure event where β = β, given that α ≤ α(β) = αmin, the equilibria of Propositions 1 and 2
coexist (see Figure 2 below for an illustration). This is because for β = β, H is indiﬀerent between discouraging
its local ﬂexible consumers from search (by pricing at vL+ s) or maximally exploiting its captive consumers while
letting go of its ﬂexible consumers (by pricing at vH). Note though that the equilibrium of Proposition 1 is less
plausible, as it gives rise to a strictly lower equilibrium proﬁt of L. Hence, L could proﬁtably bribe H to play
the more favorable (from L's perspective) equilibrium strategy of Proposition 2.
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L-consumers who drop out of the market, but fully exploit the αβ searching H-consumers, who
expect to ﬁnd a price of p∗∗L = vL. This gives rise to an optimal deviation proﬁt of Π
dev∗∗
L = vHαβ.
It is easy to see that this optimal deviation is not proﬁtable if α ≤ vLβ(vH−vL)+vL = α(β).
Example 2. Let vH = 200, vL = 100, s = 10. Then β = 0.45 and α(β) =
1
1+β . Hence, if both
β < 0.45 and α ≤ 11+β , the unique equilibrium of the game is such that p∗L = 100, p∗H = 200,
and all αβ ﬂexible consumers search and buy at L. This gives rise to equilibrium proﬁts of
Π∗∗L = 100(1− α+ αβ) and Π∗∗H = 200α(1− β).
Intuitively, β < β is simply the converse of the condition in Proposition 1: if suﬃciently few
H-consumers are ﬂexible, H would not even ﬁnd it worthwhile to ﬁght for them if L priced at
vL deterministically. Instead, H prefers to fully exploit its captive consumers by pricing at vH ,
and accepts the fact that all its local ﬂexible consumers will buy at the other ﬁrm.
More interesting is the other condition, α ≤ α(β), which rules out that L has a proﬁtable
deviation. Clearly, given that H prices at vH deterministically and does not ﬁght for its ﬂexible
consumers, an expectation of p∗L = vL by the ﬂexible H-consumers would induce them to search.
But then, if the H-market is suﬃciently important in size (α is large), L faces a commitment
problem which destroys the proposed pure-strategy equilibrium. Namely, rather than to also
serve its own local consumers at vL, L would prefer to exploit the ﬂexible consumers' beliefs (of
ﬁnding p∗L = vL in L) and charge them the highest possible price (vH) for which they do not
return to H. This is the case if α > α(β).
The outlined commitment problem and the tension to resolve it is what generates the mixed-
strategy equilibria which will be discussed below. Figure 2 illustrates the diﬀerent equilibrium
regions in (α, β)-space.
Proposition 3. If β < β and α ∈ (α(β), α(β)], where α(β) := vL
(1−β)
{
vL+
vHβ[vH (1−β)−vL]
vH (1−β)−vL−βs
} ∈
(α(β), 1),18 the unique equilibrium of the game is in mixed strategies such that19
• H prices at vH with probability q∗H := vL(1−α+αβ)vHαβ ∈ (0, 1).
• With probability 1 − q∗H , H samples prices continuously from the interval [p, vH ], where
p := vL(1−α+αβ)αβ ∈ (vL, vH), following the cumulative distribution function FH(p) := 1 −
vL(1−α+αβ)
vHαβ−vL(1−α+αβ) (vH/p− 1).
18While α(β) always falls in this range (with α(0) = 1 and α(β) = α(β) = αmin), it can be non-monotonic in
β for certain combinations of vH , vL and s.
19Note that unlike the case where β = β, there is no multiplicity of equilibria for α = α(β). This is because
the equilibria of Propositions 2 and 3 coincide for α = α(β). See the subsection on mixed-strategy equilibria in
Section 5 for the corresponding calculation.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium regions for vH = 200, vL = 100, s = 10.
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• L prices at vL with probability q∗L := 1β − vHα(1−β)vL(1−α+αβ) ∈ (0, 1).
• With probability 1 − q∗L, L samples prices continuously from [p, vH ] (the same interval as
H), following the same cumulative distribution function FL(p) := FH(p).
• As p > ρ, where the ﬂexible H-consumers' reservation price ρ solves q∗L(ρ−vL) = s, all αβ
ﬂexible H-consumers search initially. However, given that H prices at pH ∈ [p, vH), they
return with probability (1 − q∗L)(1 − FL(pH)), as in those cases L charges a higher price
than H.
• As in the case of Proposition 2, H's equilibrium proﬁt is given by Π∗∗H = vHα(1 − β),
whereas L's equilibrium proﬁt is given by Π∗∗L = vL(1− α+ αβ).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The following example illustrates an equilibrium of the above type.
Example 3. Let vH = 200, vL = 100, s = 10, α = 0.9, β = 0.14. Then β = 0.45, α ≈ 0.877
and α ≈ 0.905. As all requirements for Proposition 3 are fulﬁlled, the unique equilibrium of the
game must be characterized by it. Plugging the model parameters into the relevant equations, one
ﬁnds that ρ∗ = 134.095, q∗H ≈ 0.8968, q∗L ≈ 0.2933, Π∗∗H = 154.8, and Π∗∗L = 22.6. Moreover,
p = 179.365, and the (identical) cumulative distribution functions FH(.) and FL(.) can easily be
calculated. Figure 3 depicts the described equilibrium graphically.
The intuition to Proposition 3 is as follows. Because the H-market is large compared to L
(α > α(β)), ﬁrm L cannot commit to charging vL deterministically if the ﬂexible H-consumers
were to search (after facing pH = vH), as it strictly prefers to fully exploit these consumers'
beliefs of ﬁnding pL = vL by charging vH . However, this cannot be an equilibrium, because
(a) given pL = vH , the ﬂexible H-consumers would clearly prefer not to search, and (b) even if
these consumers were to search, H would have a proﬁtable deviation by marginally undercutting
vH (say, by pricing at vH − ), which would lead all ﬂexible H-consumers to return to H after
observing pL = vH . Consequently, L would also have a proﬁtable deviation of pricing marginally
below vH − , and so on. It turns out that this mutual undercutting argument gives rise to
the mixed-strategy equilibrium characterized in the proposition: both L and H price at their
local consumers' valuation with positive probability mass, but they also ﬁght for the ﬂexible
H-consumers in those cases where L prices above vL. In some sense, in order to mitigate L's
incentive to always exploit the searchers, H alters its strategy in such a way that it becomes
13
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harder for L to sell to the searching H-consumers if it prices above vL. H achieves this by
spreading positive probability mass on some interval below vH , implying that L is indiﬀerent
between choosing vL or any price larger than vL that lies in that interval.
Since ﬁrm L charges prices higher than vL with positive probability in equilibrium, this im-
plies that low-valuation consumers in the discount market are excluded from buying probabilis-
tically. Hence, the characterized equilibrium is in line with the empirical ﬁnding that low-income
consumers tend to suﬀer from a poor access to certain product markets, as discussed in the
introduction. This continues to hold for the last type of equilibrium to be characterized below.
Proposition 4. If β < β and α ∈ (α(β), 1), the unique equilibrium of the game is in mixed
strategies such that20
• H prices at vH with probability q∗H,vH := (1−α)(1−β)vL[(1−β)vH−vL]αβ{[(1−β)vH−vL]2+vLβs} ∈ (0, 1) and at ρ
∗ :=
vH(1 − β) with probability q∗H,ρ := 1 − vL(1−α)
αβ
(
vH (1−β)[vH (1−β)−vL]
vH (1−β)−vL−βs −vL
) ∈ (0, 1), where q∗H,vH +
q∗H,ρ < 1.
• With probability 1− q∗H,vH − q∗H,ρ, H samples prices continuously from the interval [p, vH ],
where p := vH(1−β)[vH(1−β)−vL]vH(1−β)−vL−βs , following the cumulative distribution function GH(p) :=
1− (1−β)[vH(1−β)−vL]β[vH(1−β)−vL−s] (vH/p− 1).
• L prices at vL with probability q∗L,vL := svH(1−β)−vL ∈ (0, 1).
• With probability 1 − q∗L,vL , L samples prices continuously from [p, vH ] (the same interval
as H), following the same cumulative distribution function GL(p) := GH(p).
• As H prices at the ﬂexible H-consumers' reservation price ρ∗ with positive probability
q∗H,ρ, these consumers will only search if H prices at or above p > ρ
∗, which happens
with probability 1 − q∗H,ρ. However, given that H prices at pH ∈ [p, vH), they return with
probability (1− q∗L,vL)(1−GL(pH)), as in those cases L charges a higher price than H.
• H's equilibrium proﬁt is given by Π∗∗H = vHα(1−β), whereas L's equilibrium proﬁt is given
by Π∗∗∗L :=
(1−α)(1−β)vHvL[(1−β)vH−vL]
[(1−β)vH−vL]2+vLβs .
Provided that α > αmin, the above constitutes an equilibrium whenever β lies suﬃciently close
below β.
20Note again that unlike the case where β = β, there is no multiplicity of equilibria for α = α(β). This is because
the equilibria of Propositions 3 and 4 coincide for α = α(β). See the subsection on mixed-strategy equilibria in
Section 5 for the corresponding calculation. On the other hand, the equilibria of Propositions 1 and 4 coexist if
β = β and α > α(β) = αmin (see Figure 2 above for an illustration). As in the case where Propositions 1 and 2
coexist (if β = β and α ≤ αmin), L makes a strictly higher proﬁt if the equilibrium of Proposition 4 is played.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Again, the example below showcases an equilibrium of the above type.
Example 4. Let vH = 200, vL = 100, s = 10, α = 0.9, β = 0.4. Then β = 0.45, α ≈ 0.714 and
α ≈ 0.833. Hence, all requirements for Proposition 4 are fulﬁlled, which implies that the unique
equilibrium of the game must be characterized by it. Plugging the model parameters into the
relevant equations, one ﬁnds that ρ∗ = 120, q∗H,vH = 0.416˙, q
∗
H,ρ = 0.4˙, q
∗
L,vL
= 0.5, Π∗∗H = 108,
and Π∗∗∗L = 30. Moreover, p = 150, and the (identical) cumulative distribution functions GH(.)
and GL(.) can easily be calculated. Figure 4 depicts the described equilibrium graphically.
The intuition to Proposition 4 is similar to the one of Proposition 3. The crucial diﬀerence
is that for α > α(β), the H-market is so large relative to L that ﬁrm L's commitment problem
becomes severe. This means that in order to reduce L's incentive to charge prices above vL,
it is not suﬃcient for H to solely put positive probability mass directly below vH . Instead, L
can only be made indiﬀerent between charging vL or exploiting the searching H-consumers if
the ﬂexible H-consumers do not always search. H achieves this by additionally putting positive
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probability mass on the ﬂexible H-consumers' reservation price ρ∗. A direct implication is that
L cannot even be certain to exploit the ﬂexible H-consumers if it prices at p (the lowest price in
its pricing range above vL), as with positive probability, the ﬂexible H-consumers do not search
at all. This reduction in L's proﬁtability of pricing above vL is able to resolve the tension that
is created by L's severe commitment problem.
Note that the equilibrium of Proposition 4, particularly the pricing strategy of ﬁrm H, is
consistent with empirical evidence that retail price distributions tend to be bimodal, with prices
ﬂuctuating between a regular high price and a low sales price, and little mass between (see
Hosken and Reiﬀen (2004), Pesendorfer (2002)). The present model provides a complimentary
explanation to that of Garcia et al. (2015), who generate a two-point price distribution by
introducing costly retailer search for manufacturers' oﬀers.
4 Welfare
Since the consumers have inelastic demand up to a maximum valuation of vH in H (where a total
mass α of consumers reside) and up to vL in L (where the remaining 1−α consumers reside), it
is obvious that the maximal surplus which can be achieved in the whole market is given by
Wmax := αvH + (1− α)vL. (1)
Considering the diﬀerent equilibria which were outlined in Section 3, there are two possible
sources of welfare loss in the market. First, wasteful travel expenditures to the extent of αβs
can be incurred if the αβ ﬂexible H-consumers search. And second, the L-market surplus of
(1 − α)vL is lost in those cases where L prices above vL, as this leads all L-consumers to drop
out of the market. The following proposition then follows straightforwardly from Propositions 1
to 4.
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Proposition 5. The total loss of welfare in the market is given by21
Wloss :=

αβs if β < β and α ≤ α(β)
αβs + (1− q∗L)(1− α)vL if β < β and α ∈ (α(β), α(β)]
αβs(1− q∗H,ρ) + (1− q∗L,vL)(1− α)vL if β < β and α ∈ (α(β), 1)
0 if β > β.
(2)
Note that the aggregate consumers surplus for each parameter region can easily be calculated
as CS = Wmax−Π[∗]H −Π[∗]L −Wloss, where Π[∗]i denotes the equilibrium proﬁt of ﬁrm i ∈ {H,L}
in the respective parameter region. For β > β, it holds that CS = α(vH − vL − s), whereas for
β < β and α ≤ α(β), it holds that CS = αβ(vH − vL − s). The expressions for the aggregate
consumer welfare if β < β and α > α(β) are cumbersome and will not be reported here.22
Comparative statics with respect to social welfare (and other equilibrium objects) will be
provided in the subsequent section.
5 Comparative Statics
Equilibrium Regions in (α, β)-Space
First, note that the pure-strategy regions of the game are those with either β ≥ β = 1 − vL+svH
(where H ﬁghts for its ﬂexible consumers), or β < β and α ≤ α(β) = vLβ(vH−vL)+vL (where H
prices at vH and lets its ﬂexible consumers purchase at L).
The former region evidently becomes larger in (α, β)-space if either vL or s increases relative
to vH (vH decreases relative to vL and s). The intuition is simple: in order to discourage the
ﬂexible H-consumers from search, H cannot price higher than vL + s. But if vL + s increases
(vH decreases), H's loss when decreasing its price from vH to vL+s decreases. Hence, the region
where the ﬁrm ﬁnd it's worthwhile to ﬁght for its ﬂexible consumers becomes larger.
The other pure-strategy region cannot be ranked in (α, β)-space if vL increases (vH decreases).
This is because there are two countervailing eﬀects at work. First, an increase of vL (decrease
of vH) makes it more worthwhile for H to ﬁght for its ﬂexible consumers (following the above
logic), which cuts down the equilibrium region from above by reducing the admissible set of β's
21If β = β, the equilibrium welfare loss depends on which equilibrium is played. It is zero if H plays vL + s,
whereas it is αβs ifH plays vH (for α ≤ α(β)), or αβs(1−q∗H,ρ)+(1−q∗L,vL )(1−α)vL ifH plays the mixed-strategy
equilibrium of Proposition 4 (for α > α(β) = α(β)).
22They can be obtained from the author upon request.
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(β decreases). But second, a larger vL (smaller vH) also reduces ﬁrm L's commitment problem:
if vL is closer to vH , there is less of an incentive to exploit the searching consumers' beliefs (of
ﬁnding vL) and deviating to vH . Hence, the range of admissible α's increases (α(β) increases).
Since the latter eﬀect is not present for increases in s, the discussed pure-strategy equilibrium
region unambiguously shrinks when s increases.
The combined mixed-strategy region (with either a moderate or severe commitment problem
by L) unambiguously shrinks when vL or s increases relative to vH (vH decreases relative to
vL and s). This is because H becomes more willing to ﬁght for its ﬂexible consumers if either
vL or s increases (vH decreases), and also L's commitment problem is softened as vL increases
(vH decreases). Moreover, because α(β) is strictly decreasing in s (for the relevant region where
β < β), while α(β) does not depend on s, for increasing s the range of α's where L faces a
moderate commitment problem becomes unambiguously smaller.
Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
Case (1): β < β and α ∈ (α(β), α(β)].
Consider the limit behavior of q∗H and q
∗
L ﬁrst. Inserting α(β) easily shows that limα↓α(β) q
∗
H =
limα↓α(β) q∗L = 1. Moreover, the distribution functions FH(.) and FL(.) become degenerate, with
p = vH . All of this should not be surprising, as for every α < α(β) (with β < β), the same
pure-strategy equilibrium is played. Hence, there is no discontinuity of the equilibrium strategies
played around α = α(β).
On the other hand, it is straightforward to derive that limα↑α(β) q∗H =
(1−β)[vH(1−β)−vL]
vH(1−β)−vL−βs ,
whereas limα↑α(β) q∗L =
s
vH(1−β)−vL . Also, the distribution functions FH(.) and FL(.) do not
become degenerate around α(β).
By properly manipulating q∗H , q
∗
L, p, and FH(.) = FL(.) such that one parameter gets isolated
(e.g., q∗H =
vL( 1α−1+β)
vHβ
), one can see directly that q∗H , and p are strictly decreasing in α and β,
while q∗L is only strictly decreasing in α. The comparative statics of q
∗
L with respect to β are
ambiguous.23 At the same time, FH(.) and FL(.) are strictly increasing in α and β. Hence, if
L's commitment problem gets more severe (α increases), in equilibrium less probability mass is
put on the mass points q∗H and q
∗
L, while the ﬁrms' pricing also gets more aggressive (in the
sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance) when sampling prices from their continuous range.
One interpretation is that L tries to exploit the searching consumers more due to its larger
23While q∗L is typically decreasing in β, numerical examples can be provided where q
∗
L increases with β for α
close to α(β).
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commitment problem, but this is counterbalanced by H, which makes it harder for L to steal
H's ﬂexible consumers while charging a price higher than vL.
None of the discussed equilibrium objects depends on s, while it is easy to check that q∗H ,
p, q∗L (FH(.), FL(.)) strictly increase (decrease) in vL. Finally, it is straightforward to establish
that q∗H , q
∗
L, FH(.) and FL(.) strictly decrease in vH , while p is constant in vH .
Case (2): β < β and α > α(β).
Consider the limit behavior of q∗H,vH , q
∗
H,ρ and q
∗
L,vL
ﬁrst. Inserting α(β) shows that limα↓α(β) q∗H,vH =
(1−β)[vH(1−β)−vL]
vH(1−β)−vL−βs = limα↑α(β) q
∗
H . Moreover, limα↓α(β) q
∗
H,ρ = 0 and limα↓α(β) q
∗
L,vL
= svH(1−β)−vL =
limα↑α(β) q∗L. As also the distribution functions GH(.) = GL(.) coincide with FH(.) = FL(.) for
α = α(β), it is established that there is no discontinuity of the equilibrium strategies played
around α = α(β).
Next, while q∗L,vL is constant in α (and thus stays at
s
vH(1−β)−vL ), it holds that limα↑1 q
∗
H,vH
=
0 and limα↑1 q∗H,ρ = 1. Hence, for values of α close to one (implying a huge H-market relative to
L), H will almost certainly price at ρ and discourage its ﬂexible consumers from search. Only
because of that, L has no incentive to always price above vL in equilibrium.
One can also look at the mass points' comparative statics as β tends to β. Doing so, I ﬁnd
that limβ↑β q
∗
H,vH
= (1−α)vHvLα(vH−vL)(vH−vL−s) ∈ (0, 1), limβ↑β q∗H,ρ = 1 −
(1−α)vHvL
α(vH−vL)(vH−vL−s) ∈ (0, 1),
and limβ↑β q
∗
L,vL
= 1. Thus, there is a discontinuity of H's (but not L's) equilibrium strategy
around β = β. While for β < β, H (almost exclusively) mixes between charging vH and ρ at a
certain ratio, H jumps to charging vH deterministically for β > β.
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Furthermore, it can be seen directly from their deﬁnitions that q∗H,vH is strictly decreasing in
α whereas q∗H,ρ is strictly increasing in α (as mentioned before, q
∗
L,vL
is constant in α). Moreover,
GH(.) and the identical GL(.) (and therefore, p) are constant in α. As L's commitment problem
gets stronger (α increases), H will put more probability mass on ρ in order to counterbalance
L's larger incentive to exploit the ﬂexible H-consumers. Since it becomes less likely that L is
visited by them for increasing α, also L's incentive to charge prices above vL is mitigated.
While q∗L,vL is strictly increasing in β, the comparative statics of q
∗
H,vH
, q∗H,ρ and GH(.) =
GL(.) with respect to β can be ambiguous. In particular, numerical simulations reveal that this
ambiguity is typically the case for the distribution functions GH(.) = GL(.), whereas it is only
the case for the mass points q∗H,vH and q
∗
H,ρ if s is relatively small. In contrast, for suﬃciently
large s, q∗H,vH is strictly decreasing in β whereas q
∗
H,ρ is strictly increasing in β.
24For β = β, H is indiﬀerent between doing either.
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It is also straightforward to check that q∗H,ρ , q
∗
L,vL
and p are strictly increasing in s, whereas
q∗H,vH and GH(.) = GL(.) are strictly decreasing in s. The comparative statics of q
∗
H,vH
and q∗H,ρ
with respect to vL are ambiguous (as can easily be shown numerically). On the other hand, q
∗
L,vL
and p are strictly increasing in vL, whereas GH(.) = GL(.) are strictly decreasing in it. Lastly,
apart from q∗L,vL which is strictly decreasing in vH , all other equilibrium-strategy objects have
ambiguous comparative statics with respect to vH .
Table 1 summarizes the comparative statics of the mixed-strategy price distributions charac-
terized for Cases (1) and (2) above. Hereby, +, −, 0, and +− denote positive, negative, neutral,
and ambiguous eﬀects, respectively.
Table 1: Comparative statics of the ﬁrms' equilibrium price distributions
α β s vL vH
q∗H − − 0 + −
q∗L − +− 0 + 0
p − − 0 + −
FH(.) + + 0 − −
FL(.) + + 0 − −
α β s vL vH
q∗H,vH − +− − +− +−
q∗H,ρ + +− + +− +−
q∗L,vL 0 + + + −
p 0 +− + + +−
GH(.) 0 +− − − +−
GL(.) 0 +− − − +−
Equilibrium Proﬁts
Case (1): β > β. For β > β, the unique equilibrium of the game gives rise to equilibrium
proﬁts of Π∗H = (vL + s)α and Π
∗
L = vL(1 − α). It is thus apparent that the ﬁrms' equilibrium
proﬁts in the discussed region are independent of β, strictly increase (decrease) in α for H (L),
and strictly increase in the valuation vL of L-consumers. Moreover, H's equilibrium proﬁt is
strictly increasing in the search cost s.
The intuition to these results is as follows. Since β is large, H ﬁghts for its ﬂexible consumers
by pricing at their reservation price. Given L's price vL, this reservation price is vL + s. Hence,
H's equilibrium proﬁt increases for larger vL and s. As H serves the whole H-market in the
respective equilibrium, its proﬁt strictly increases with this market's size α. The price L charges
in equilibrium is vL, and doing so it can only attract the mass 1 − α of its local consumers.
Hence, a larger vL and lower α (that is, a bigger L-market 1− α) increases L's proﬁt.
Case (2): β < β. For β < β, no matter what α, the respective unique equilibrium of the
game implies an (expected) proﬁt of Π∗∗H = vHα(1−β) for H. That is, for suﬃciently few ﬂexible
consumers β, H's equilibrium proﬁt is strictly increasing in its local consumers' valuation vH
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and the H-market size α, while it is strictly decreasing in the fraction of ﬂexible consumers β.
The exact intuition depends on the type of equilibrium that is played (Propositions 2 to 4),
which is a function of the severity of L's commitment problem (if any). But generally speaking,
α(1−β) is the mass of H's captive consumers (the mass H-consumers who are not ﬂexible), and
the maximal price H can charge them is vH . Hence, the more captive consumers there are in
H's market, and the higher their willingness to pay, the higher is H's equilibrium proﬁt.
For β < β and α ≤ α(β), L's (expected) equilibrium proﬁt is given by vL(1− α+ αβ). It is
easy to see that this expression is strictly decreasing in α and vL, while it is strictly increasing
in β. Again, the exact interpretation depends on the type of equilibrium that is played (no
commitment problem vs. a moderate commitment problem). A general intuition is that if L's
commitment problem is not too large, the ﬁrm's equilibrium proﬁt increases with the fraction β
of ﬂexible H-consumers it can attract, its local consumers' valuation vL, and also the relative
size of L's local market 1 − α. The latter is true because the total mass of consumers L can
(potentially) serve is 1− α+ αβ, which increases in the fraction of L-consumers 1− α.
For β < β and α > α(β), L's equilibrium proﬁt is given by Π∗∗∗L =
(1−α)(1−β)vHvL[(1−β)vH−vL]
[(1−β)vH−vL]2+vLβs .
It is easy to see that this expression is strictly decreasing in α. Similar to the case where L's
commitment problem is less severe (or not there at all), a smaller relative size of the L-market
(larger α) leads to lower equilibrium proﬁts of L. Next, the comparative statics of Π∗∗∗L with
respect to β are generally ambiguous. The intuition is that there are typically two opposing
eﬀects at play. Namely, a higher β means that more ﬂexible consumers coming from H can
potentially be served, but also that L's commitment problem becomes more severe. In turn, this
leads H to sample its ﬂexible consumers' reservation price ρ more often, which discourages the
ﬂexible H-consumers from search.
One can also observe that L's equilibrium proﬁt strictly decreases with s. This is true because
H will price at the ﬂexibleH-consumers' reservation price ρmore often for larger s, which directly
reduces L's expected demand. Finally, the comparative statics of Π∗∗∗L with respect to vL and
vH are generally ambiguous.
Table 2 summarizes the (local) comparative statics of the ﬁrms' equilibrium proﬁts across the
diﬀerent equilibrium regions. Again, +, −, 0, and +− denote positive, negative, neutral, and
ambiguous eﬀects, respectively.
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Table 2: Local comparative statics of the ﬁrms' equilibrium proﬁts
α β s vL vH
Π∗H(I) + 0 + + 0
Π∗H(II) + − 0 0 +
Π∗H(III) + − 0 0 +
Π∗H(IV ) + − 0 0 +
α β s vL vH
Π∗L(I) − 0 0 + 0
Π∗L(II) − + 0 + 0
Π∗L(III) − + 0 + 0
Π∗L(IV ) − +− − +− +−
Welfare
Since the maximal achievable welfare in the market is given by αvH+(1−α)vL and thus depends
on α, vH and vL, it makes sense to focus on the relative welfare loss that arises in equilibrium.
From equation (2), it is easy to see that this relative welfare loss can be written as
W rloss =

αβs
αvH+(1−α)vL if β < β and α ≤ α(β)
αβs +(1−q∗L)(1−α)vL
αvH+(1−α)vL if β < β and α ∈ (α(β), α(β)]
αβs(1−q∗H,ρ)+(1−q∗L,vL )(1−α)vL
αvH+(1−α)vL if β < β and α ∈ (α(β), 1)
0 if β > β.
(3)
First, note that for β < β and α ≤ α(β), the relative welfare loss strictly increases in α and
β. The simple intuition is that a higher α or β increases the mass of ﬂexible H-consumers who
incur wasteful travel expenditures in the respective equilibrium (in the case of α, the increase in
the total achievable welfare cannot make up for that). Moreover, given that β does not fall short
of β, also increases in s unambiguously increase the relative welfare loss in the market. This
is because each (searching) ﬂexible H-consumer incurs a larger loss from search if s increases.
Increases in vL or vH lead to an unambiguous decrease of the relative welfare loss, as the absolute
welfare loss of αβs stays constant, but the total achievable surplus in the market increases.
Second, the comparative statics of the relative welfare loss with respect to α and β are
generally ambiguous if β < β and α ∈ (α(β), α(β)].25 Intuitively, this is the case because there
can be countervailing eﬀects at work. Clearly, an increase in α or β increases the mass of ﬂexible
H-consumers (who all search initially), which implies that larger wasteful travel expenditures to
the extent of αβs are incurred. Also, increases in α unambiguously reduce the probability that L
serves its local consumers by pricing at vL in equilibrium (see the discussion on the comparative
statics of mixed-strategy equilibria above), which increases the absolute welfare loss by giving
rise to additional deadweight loss (caused by L-consumers dropping out of the market). However,
25However, it should be noted that the relative welfare loss is typically increasing in α and β in the relevant
region. This is true in particular if s is large.
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provided that s is suﬃciently low, an increase in α can also have a beneﬁcial eﬀect because it
may increase the total surplus achievable in the market by more (relatively speaking) than it
increases the total welfare loss.26 On the other hand, an increase in β can have a beneﬁcial eﬀect
because for some parameter combinations, increases in β lead L to sample vL more often. In
turn, less deadweight loss by dropout L-consumers is created.
Moreover, given that β does not start to exceed β or α starts to exceed α(β), increases in s
unambiguously increase the relative welfare loss in the market. As above, this is because each
(searching) ﬂexible H-consumers incurs a larger loss from search if s increases, while at the same
time, the probability that L samples vL (and serves its local consumers) is unaﬀected by s. It is
also not diﬃcult to show via diﬀerentiation that the relative welfare loss in the analyzed region
must strictly decrease in vL. A somewhat more intricate proof reveals that the relative welfare
loss in the region is strictly increasing in vH .
27
Third, if β < β and α > α(β), the comparative statics of the relative welfare loss with respect
to α and β are unambiguously negative.28 The intuition is that although increases in α and β
increase the total search friction created by searching ﬂexible H-consumers, this is always more
than oﬀset by welfare-increasing changes in the ﬁrms' equilibrium strategies. Namely, increases
in α unambiguously increase the probability that H samples ρ in equilibrium (avoiding wasteful
travel expenditures altogether), while at the same time they do not alter L's probability of
sampling vL (and thus serving its local consumers). On the other hand, increases in β may have
an ambiguous eﬀect on the probability that H prices at ρ, but they unambiguously increase L's
probability of serving its local consumers by pricing at vL.
It may be interesting to observe that the relative welfare loss in the discussed region unam-
biguously decreases in s.29 Hence, given that L's commitment problem is severe, an increase in
26This eﬀect is not possible in the case where the only welfare loss stems from wasteful search expenditures (see
above). The reason is that in this case, an increase in α implies a one-to-one increase in the absolute welfare loss,
whereas it results in a less than one-to-one increase of the maximal achievable welfare.
27For a sketch of the proof, note ﬁrst that the derivative of the region's relative welfare loss with respect to vH
has the same sign as Φ(α) := α2(1 − β)(β2s + vL) − α[2vL − βvL + β2(s − vL)] + (1 − β2)vL, which is strictly
convex in α. Since it is required that α > α(β) in the considered parameter region, it is suﬃcient to show that
Φ(α) is non-negative for α = α(β). This is indeed the case for β < β.
28The proof for α is simple, as αβ(1 − q∗H,ρ) reduces to 1 − α times a positive (parameter-dependent) fac-
tor. For β, a straightforward calculation reveals that d
dβ
(
αβs(1−q∗H,ρ)+(1−q∗L,vL )(1−α)vL
αvH+(1−α)vL
)
< 0 is equivalent to
d
dβ
(
vH (1−β)−vL−βs
[vH (1−β)−vL]2+vLβs −
1
vH (1−β)−vL
)
< 0. After diﬀerentiating and simplifying, this condition can be stated
as (1− β)3(1 + β)v3H − 3(1− β)2v2HvL + 3(1− β)2vHv2L − v3L + v2L(β2s+ 2βvL) > 0. Rewriting and setting s = 0
yields the suﬃcient condition [(1−β)vH − vL]3 +β[(1−β)3v3H − 3(1−β)vHv2L + 2v3L] > 0. Here, the left bracket
is strictly positive due to β < β, while the right bracket reaches its global minimum of 0 (over the range β ∈ [0, 1])
at βmin = 1− vLvH . Hence, the sum is strictly positive.
29This result is straightforward to obtain via diﬀerentiation.
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the search friction unambiguously improves market performance. Intuitively, this is true because
in the relevant region, an increase in s unambiguously increases the probability that L prices at
vL (reducing the deadweight loss from dropout L-consumers) and that H prices at ρ (reducing
the probability of wasteful travel expenditures). This is always more than enough to oﬀset the
adverse eﬀect of higher travel costs on welfare.
Finally, it can be shown numerically that the comparative statics of the relative welfare loss
with respect to vL and vH are generally ambiguous in the considered parameter region.
Table 3 summarizes the (local) comparative statics of the relative welfare loss in the market
across the diﬀerent equilibrium regions. As above, +, −, 0, and +− denote positive, negative,
neutral, and ambiguous eﬀects, respectively.
Table 3: Local comparative statics of the relative welfare loss in the market
α β s vL vH
W rloss(I) 0 0 0 0 0
W rloss(II) + + + − −
W rloss(III) +− +− + − +
W rloss(IV ) − − − +− +−
An interesting take-away from this table and the preceding discussion is that in several regions
in parameter space, more isolated markets (lower β or larger s), as well as a larger diﬀerence
in willingness to pay (larger vH or lower vL; this could also be interpreted as an increased
income inequality), improve market performance. A major driving force of the former result
is of course that travel is socially wasteful in the model, such that decreasing the number of
traveling consumers, or discouraging consumers from traveling due to higher costs, can improve
social welfare. The second result can either stem from a dominant direct eﬀect  increasing the
valuation of high-valuation consumers while keeping everything else equal increases the total
surplus more than it increases wasteful travel expenditures  or from more subtle changes in
ﬁrms' equilibrium pricing behavior. Perhaps surprisingly, decreasing the maximum valuation of
low-valuation consumers (making the poor even poorer) can still improve market performance,
although this has a direct negative eﬀect and, at the same time, fosters the exclusion of this
consumer group (see Table 1). The reason is that due to ﬁrms' equilibrating strategies, high-
valuation consumers may ﬁnd themselves more often in a situation with a very attractive price
oﬀer (ρ∗) that discourages them from engaging in wasteful travel.
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6 Advertising
In this section, I will extend the baseline model in order to study the eﬀects of informative
advertising on ﬁrms' equilibrium pricing. In particular, consider the following extension of the
main model outlined in Section 2.
Setup
There is a preliminary stage in which both ﬁrms simultaneously decide whether to engage in
an advertising campaign or not. For a cost of A > 0 (ﬁrm L) and AH > 0 (ﬁrm H), such a
campaign commits the engaging ﬁrm to charge some (freely chosen) advertised price for the rest
of the game (essentially eliminating its price-setting stage), while fully informing all consumers
(in particular, the ﬂexible consumers from the other market) and its rival that it charges and
advertises the respective price.
The consumers' travel costs in L follow an arbitrary distribution, with no positive mass of
L-consumers having zero travel cost. Therefore, let the lowest travel cost in L be given by
sL ∈ (0, vL). As in the baseline model, the H-market has a fraction β of ﬂexible consumers with
common travel cost s.
Given this, there are three possibilities. First, if both ﬁrms advertise, the prices in the mar-
ket become common knowledge, and the ﬂexible consumers optimally buy at the ﬁrm which
oﬀers them a lower price (net of travel costs). Second, if only one ﬁrm engages in the advertis-
ing campaign, I assume that the other ﬁrm (which has not invested in advertising) becomes a
Stackelberg-follower. That is, the ﬁrm observes the other ﬁrm's advertised price and may freely
choose an arbitrary price as response. Importantly, while in such a scenario it is common knowl-
edge that only one ﬁrm has advertised (and which ﬁrm that is), consumers do not observe the
price of the non-advertising ﬁrm if it is located in the other market. After the non-advertising
ﬁrm sets a price in response to the advertised price by its rival, the consumers make their pur-
chase decision (forming beliefs if the other ﬁrm's price is unobserved). And third, if both ﬁrms
do not advertise, the original game outlined in Section 2 is played.
Equilibrium Analysis
As a start, the following lemma is easy to prove.
Lemma 1. There cannot be an equilibrium where both L and H advertise.
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Proof. Suppose this was the case. Then clearly, there must be at least one ﬁrm that does not
attract the ﬂexible consumers from the other local submarket (because its advertised price is not
lower than its rival's advertised price). Hence, given the rival's advertising strategy, the concerned
ﬁrm could certainly do better by not advertising, but charging the same price as before, being a
Stackelberg-follower. Doing so, the ﬁrm will not lose any (additional) local consumers, but can
save the (otherwise wasteful) advertising cost.
Consequently, there can only exist three types of equilibria: two asymmetric ones in which
either L or H advertises, and one symmetric one (in the sense of advertising) in which none of
the ﬁrms advertises.
Note furthermore that an asymmetric equilibrium where only H advertises exists under cer-
tain circumstances. The necessary ingredients of such an equilibrium are that H's advertising
cost AH is low, few consumers live in H, the minimal travel cost of L-consumers sL is not too
high, and the L-market consists of consumers that are heterogeneous with respect to their travel
costs (such that L may prefer not to ﬁght for a subset of these consumers after H advertises
a very low price).30 As these conditions are somewhat contrived, I will subsequently ignore for
equilibria where H advertises. Moreover, in order to avoid tedious checks whether H may have
a proﬁtable deviation by advertising, the following assumption is made.
Assumption 1. Given the model parameters (including the search-cost distribution of L-consumers),
H never has an incentive to advertise due to its high advertising cost AH .
Clearly, a suﬃcient condition for this is that vHα(1 − β) ≥ vL − sL − AH : even if H could
attract all consumers in L by advertising vL − sL (and thus serving the whole market for a net
proﬁt of vL−sL−AH), this would not be more proﬁtable than to only serve its captive consumers
at price vH .
Now that H's advertising decision need not be considered anymore, I will proceed to charac-
terize when advertising by L is an equilibrium outcome. For this, start with a scenario in which
L is forced to engage in an advertising campaign. I will ﬁrst derive which price is optimal to
advertise for L under this assumption, calculate the corresponding proﬁt, and ﬁnally compare
this with the proﬁt L would obtain if it did not advertise (and hence, with the equilibrium proﬁt
of the baseline model with no advertising).
30Examples are easy to construct and can be obtained from the author upon request.
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First, note that it can never be optimal for L to advertise a price pL ≥ vH − s. Such a price
would never attract the ﬂexible H-consumers due to their search cost,31 and also L would not
be able to serve its local consumers due to vH − s > vL. Hence, suppose L advertises some price
pL ∈ (0, vH − s). In turn, H's best reply as Stackelberg-follower to such a price must either
be vH (letting the ﬂexible H-consumers move on and fully exploiting its captive consumers),
or pL + s (discouraging the ﬂexible H-consumers from search). The former leads to a proﬁt of
ΠH(vH) = vHα(1− β), the latter to ΠH(pL + s) = (pL + s)α. Comparing these two expressions,
it follows that32
BRH(pL) =
vH if pL ≤ vH(1− β)− spL + s if pL > vH(1− β)− s.
Which price pL should L advertise? It is easy to see that there only two alternatives which can
be optimal. One possibility is to price at vH(1 − β) − s, which is the highest possible price for
which H accommodates L, allowing L to serve H's ﬂexible consumers (but possibly lies above
L's local consumers' valuation vL). The other is to price at vL. This fully exploits L's local
consumers, but either implies that H will ﬁght for its local consumers (if vL > vH(1 − β) − s,
i.e., β > β), or that the ﬂexible H-consumers are not fully exploited (if vL < vH(1− β)− s, i.e.,
β < β). Importantly, in all of the subsequent analysis, I will ignore the zero-measure event where
β = β. This is because if, and only if β = β, there is equilibrium multiplicity in the baseline
game, which makes L's optimal advertising strategy contingent on which equilibrium would be
played without advertising.
Now, in the ﬁrst case where vL > vH(1− β)− s (β > β), it holds that ΠL(vH(1− β)− s) =
[vH(1 − β) − s](1 − α + αβ), whereas ΠL(vL) = vL(1 − α). Comparing these expressions, one
ﬁnds that advertising vH(1− β)− s (rather than vL) is strictly better if and only if
α > α˜(β) :=
vL − [vH(1− β)− s]
vL − (1− β)[vH(1− β)− s] > 0.
33 (4)
31The weak inequality follows from the original tie-breaking rule according to which the ﬂexible H-consumers
will not search if they are indiﬀerent between doing so and purchasing at H directly.
32As a tie-breaking rule, I assume that H will accommodate L (by pricing at vH) if it is indiﬀerent between
doing so and ﬁghting for its ﬂexible consumers (by charging pL + s).
33Note that α˜(β) = 0 and
dα˜(β)
dβ
> 0 for all β > β. One way to show the latter is to rewrite α˜(β) as
vL
vH (1−β)−s
−1
vL
vH (1−β)−s
−1+β :=
γ(β)
γ(β)+β
. Then
d
(
γ(β)
γ(β)+β
)
dβ
has the same sign as γ′(β)β−γ(β) = βvLvH
[vH (1−β)−s]2 −
vL
vH (1−β)−s +
1 ≥ βvLvH
[vH (1−β)−s]vL −
vL
vH (1−β)−s + 1, where the last inequality follows from vH(1− β)− s ≤ vL (due to β ≥ β).
Simplifying βvLvH
[vH (1−β)−s]vL −
vL
vH (1−β)−s + 1 > 0 leads to s < vH − vL, as assumed.
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The interpretation to this is as follows. If β > β and hence many consumers in H are ﬂexible,
it does not suﬃce to advertise vL in order for L to attract these ﬂexible consumers. This is because
H would respond by charging a price that is suﬃciently low to discourage its local consumers
from search. Hence, to avoid such an aggressive response by H, L has to advertise a price below
the reservation price of its local consumers (namely, it can charge at most vH(1− β)− s < vL).
But this will only be preferred to fully exploiting L's local consumers (by charging vL) if the
H-market is suﬃciently large in size (α > α˜(β)), given the fraction of ﬂexible consumers in that
market. If β is very large (β > 1 − svH ), it turns out that even α = 1 would not be suﬃcient
to induce L to advertise vH(1 − β) − s < vL. The simple reason is that vH(1 − β) − s < 0 for
β > 1 − svH : L would have to advertise a price below its marginal cost in order to prevent an
aggressive price response by H.
In the second case where vL < vH(1 − β) − s (β < β), pricing at vH(1 − β) − s drives out
L's local consumers. Hence, one ﬁnds that ΠL(vH(1 − β) − s) = [vH(1 − β) − s]αβ, whereas
ΠL(vL) = vL(1−α+αβ). Again comparing these expressions, advertising vH(1− β)− s (rather
than vL) is strictly preferred if and only if
α > αˆ(β) :=
vL
β[vH(1− β)− s] + vL(1− β) ∈ (α(β), 1).
34 (5)
In this case, the interpretation is diﬀerent. As the fraction of ﬂexible H-consumers is low
(β < β), H would not even ﬁght for its local consumers if L advertised vL. But if α is very large
(α > αˆ(β)) and hence the L-market is relatively unimportant in size, L prefers to advertise the
highest possible price which triggers no aggressive response by H. This price fully exploits the
searching ﬂexible H-consumers, but drives out L's local consumers.
One can now calculate L's maximal advertising proﬁt in each parameter region and contrast
this with L's equilibrium proﬁt of the baseline game. Combining the above results, H's maximal
advertising proﬁt is given by
ΠA∗L =

vL(1− α)−A if β > β and α ≤ α˜(β)
[vH(1− β)− s](1− α+ αβ)−A if β > β and α > α˜(β)
vL(1− α+ αβ)−A if β < β and α ≤ αˆ(β)
[vH(1− β)− s]αβ −A if β < β and α > αˆ(β).
34The inequality αˆ(β) < 1 is equivalent to β < β, which has to hold in the considered region. On the other
hand, after some straightforward calculation it turns out that αˆ(β) > α(β) is equivalent to vH(1−β)−vL+β(1−
β)vH − βs > 0. This is true because vH(1− β)− vL − s > 0 whenever β < β.
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Comparing these with the equilibrium proﬁts of the game without advertising (see Proposi-
tions 1 to 4), it is immediately apparent that L should not advertise if either β > β and α ≤ α˜(β),
or β < β and α ≤ α(β). The former is true because in the baseline game, H will charge vL in
equilibrium whenever β > β. Hence, it cannot pay to engage in costly advertising of vL, as this
price would be expected anyway by the ﬂexible H-consumers.
The latter is true because of two reasons. First, similar to the case of β > β, H would charge
a deterministic price of vL anyway if β < β and α ≤ α(β). Therefore, it is again pointless to
advertise vL at positive cost. Second, while L faces a commitment problem if α ∈ (α(β), α(β)], the
ﬁrms' equilibrating strategies still lead to an expected L-proﬁt of vL(1−α+αβ) (this is because
L sometimes sells to the searching H-consumers at a price larger than vL, but sometimes makes
no sales at all). As this expected proﬁt is identical to the gross proﬁt (gross of the advertising
cost) the ﬁrm could achieve by advertising vL, but does not require costly advertising, L strictly
prefers to abstain from advertising.
Next, note that L will advertise vH(1 − β) − s in equilibrium if β > β, α > α˜(β), and A is
suﬃciently small. This is because L's proﬁt without advertising in this region would be given
by Π∗L = vL(1 − α) (see Proposition 1), whereas L's (maximal) gross proﬁt when advertising is
given by [vH(1− β)− s](1− α+ αβ). The latter exceeds the former whenever α > α˜(β), as was
already established above. Hence, for a suﬃciently small advertising cost A, L's dominant action
in the discussed parameter region is to advertise vH(1− β)− s < vL.
Similarly, L will advertise vL in equilibrium if β < β, α ∈ (α(β), αˆ(β)), and A is suﬃciently
small. The reason is that L's proﬁt without advertising in this region would be given by Π∗∗∗L =
(1−α)(1−β)vHvL[(1−β)vH−vL]
[(1−β)vH−vL]2+vLβs (see Proposition 4), while L's (maximal) gross proﬁt when advertising
is given by Π∗∗L = vL(1− α+ αβ). The latter exceeds the former in the relevant region because
(a) Π∗∗∗L |α=α(β) = Π∗∗L |α=α(β) (as is straightforward to check) and (b) ∂Π
∗∗∗
L
∂α <
∂Π∗∗L
∂α < 0 (where
the ﬁrst inequality follows from s < vH(1− β)− vL, i.e., β < β). Consequently, for a suﬃciently
small advertising cost A, L's dominant action in the discussed parameter region is to advertise
vL.
Finally, L will advertise vH(1 − β) − s > vL in equilibrium if β < β, α > αˆ(β), and A is
suﬃciently small.35 The simple reason is that advertising vH(1−β)− s (in order to fully exploit
the searching consumers from H) outperforms advertising vL if α exceeds αˆ(β) (as was already
established above). Because advertising vL is already superior to not advertising (in terms of
35If α = αˆ(β) (and β < β as well as A small), L is indiﬀerent between advertising vL and vH(1− β)− s.
30
gross proﬁt) for α > α(β) (see the previous paragraph), a suﬃciently small advertising cost A
will induce L to advertise vH(1− β)− s in equilibrium, given that α > αˆ(β).
The above ﬁndings are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, L's equilibrium advertising behavior is charac-
terized as follows.36
(1) Advertise vH(1−β)−s < vL if β > β, α > α˜(β), and A ≤ [vH(1−β)−s](1−α+αβ)−vL(1−α).
(2) Advertise vL if β < β, α ∈ (α(β), αˆ(β)], and A ≤ vL(1−α+αβ)− (1−α)(1−β)vHvL[(1−β)vH−vL][(1−β)vH−vL]2+vLβs .
(3) Advertise vH(1 − β) − s > vL if β < β, α > αˆ(β), and A ≤ [vH(1 − β) − s]αβ −
(1−α)(1−β)vHvL[(1−β)vH−vL]
[(1−β)vH−vL]2+vLβs .
(4) Otherwise, do not advertise.
Figure 5 depicts an example of L's equilibrium advertising regions in (α, β)-space.
In the ﬁnal part of this section, I will discuss the welfare consequences of advertising by L.
First, note that advertising when β > β is clearly wasteful from a social point of view. While
without advertising, the social ﬁrst-best would be achieved (which is characterized by no search
and an L-market that is always served), advertising of vH(1 − β) − s < vL by L leads to a
deterministic welfare loss of αβs + A. In particular, even if A is close to zero, wasteful travel
expenditures to the extent of αβs would be induced by L's advertising.
Next, it is also apparent that advertising must have an adverse eﬀect on social welfare if
β < β and α ≥ αˆ(β). The reason is that in this parameter region, L will advertise a price that is
higher than its local consumers' valuation (namely vH(1−β)−s > vL), yet induces deterministic
search by the ﬂexible H-consumers. Therefore, the total welfare loss that is generated is given by
αβs+ (1−α)vL +A. In contrast, as αˆ(β) > α(β), the welfare loss in the baseline model without
advertising would only be given by αβs(1− q∗H,ρ)+(1− q∗L,vL)(1−α)vL. This is because without
advertising, H would sometimes price at its ﬂexible consumers' reservation price ρ (reducing
wasteful travel expenditures), while L would only sometimes price above vL (reducing the welfare
loss that stems from L-consumers dropping out).
Observe moreover that L does not gain from advertising if β < β and α ∈ (α(β), α(β)].
However, provided that advertising is not too costly, it would be desirable from a social-welfare
perspective. This is because for α > α(β), L's commitment problem kicks in, which leads the
ﬁrm to price above vL with positive probability. Yet at the same time, the ﬂexible H-consumers
always search, as H always prices above their reservation price. If instead ﬁrm L advertised vL,
36As tie-breaking rules, I assume that L will advertise if it is indiﬀerent between doing so and not advertising,
and that it will advertise vL if it is indiﬀerent between doing so and advertising vH(1− β)− s.
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Figure 5: L's equilibrium advertising regions for vH = 200, vL = 100, s = 10, A negligibly small.
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the L-market could be served with certainty, while no additional welfare loss would be incurred.
Hence, for α ∈ (α(β), α(β)], there may be underinvestment in advertising.
Finally, the welfare consequences of advertising when β < β and α ∈ (α(β), αˆ(β)) are am-
biguous. This is because vL would be advertised (eliminating the welfare loss which arises from
L-consumers dropping out when L prices above vL), but also more wasteful travel expenditures
would be generated, as H ceases to price at its ﬂexible consumers' reservation price with positive
probability.
7 Supply-side Heterogeneities
The main model of Sections 2 to 6 focuses on the case of local demand-side heterogeneities. In
particular, the ﬂexible H-consumers' equilibrium search behavior is caused by a diﬀerence in the
local monopoly price which stems from heterogeneous consumer product valuations across the
local submarkets. For a suﬃciently large high-valuation market, the ﬁrm in the low-valuation
market cannot commit to serving searching H-consumers at the low-valuation monopoly price
vL, which gives rise to non-trivial mixed-strategy equilibria.
The purpose of this section is to show that directed consumer-search behavior to (perceived)
discount markets can also be explained by supply-side heterogeneities alone. In fact, the only
necessary ingredients are that in isolation, the local monopoly prices would diﬀer, and that the
ﬂexible consumers' search cost is suﬃciently low such that search is proﬁtable. More precisely, I
identify two simple supply-side heterogeneities which can induce search in equilibrium: (1) a unit
cost diﬀerence with downward sloping demand, and (2) a diﬀerence in the number of incumbent
ﬁrms (intensity of competition).
Unit Cost Diﬀerence
Consider the following variation of the market setup of Sections 2 to 6. All consumers have a
common downward sloping demand schedule D(p), with an associated monopoly price of pm(c)
(monopoly proﬁt of Πm(c)) that strictly increases (decreases) with a ﬁrm's constant unit cost
c.37 A mass 1− α of consumers live in market L, whereas the remaining mass α consumers live
in H (this includes the even more symmetric case where α = 12 ). In each local market, a fraction
β ∈ (0, 1) of consumers is ﬂexible and can travel to the other market at strictly positive cost
s > 0, purchasing on the way according to their schedule D(p) if the observed price is lower.
37It is a straightforward exercise to show that every well-behaved demand function must fulﬁll the latter two
criteria.
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Importantly, the incumbent ﬁrms are not symmetric: whereas the ﬁrm in L has a unit cost that
is normalized to cL = 0, the other ﬁrm has a strictly positive unit cost of cH = c > 0. Moreover,
in order to make the problem interesting, assume that ∆(CS) :=
∫ pm(c)
pm(0)
D(p)dp > s: if both
ﬁrms were to price at their respective market's local monopoly price deterministically, the ﬂexible
H-consumers' search cost would be suﬃciently low to generate search. Then it is not diﬃcult to
prove the following proposition.
Proposition 7. If β < 1 − (ρ−c)D(ρ)Πm(c) , where ρ ∈ (pm(0), pm(c)) solves
∫ ρ
pm(0)
D(p)dp = s, the
unique equilibrium of the game is in pure strategies such that p∗H = p
m(c), p∗L = p
m(0), and all
αβ ﬂexible H-consumers search and purchase in L. If β > 1− (ρ−c)D(ρ)Πm(c) , the unique equilibrium
of the game is such that p∗H = ρ, p
∗
L = p
m(0), and no consumers search in equilibrium.38
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition to Proposition 7 is simple: if and only if there are suﬃciently few ﬂexible con-
sumers in H, ﬁrm H prefers to accommodate its rival and price at the local monopoly price,
rather than to ﬁght for its local ﬂexible consumers by charging such a low price that makes them
indiﬀerent between switching to the other market or purchasing directly at H. If H has a major
cost disadvantage, it can even be the case that H will never ﬁght for its local ﬂexible consumers
(even if all of them were ﬂexible), as it would have to decrease its price below marginal cost.
Diﬀering Number of Firms
Consider the following simple setup. All consumers have unit demand up to a maximum valuation
of v > 0. A mass 1−α of consumers live in market L, whereas the remaining mass α consumers
live in H (this includes the even more symmetric case where α = 12 ). In each local market, a
fraction β ∈ (0, 1) of consumers is ﬂexible and can travel to the other market at strictly positive
cost s ∈ (0, v), purchasing on the way if the observed price is lower (given that it does not exceed
v). The asymmetry comes from the number of ﬁrms in the market: while there is only one ﬁrm
in H, there are N ≥ 2 identical ﬁrms in L. All of them have identical, constant unit costs which
are normalized to zero. For simplicity, assume that consumers within a given market observe all
of the local market's prices and always buy at the cheapest ﬁrm. Hence, there is a Bertrand-type
of competition within L, but not H. Then the following proposition easily follows.
38In the borderline case where β = 1− (ρ−c)D(ρ)
Πm(c)
, both constitute an equilibrium, as H is indiﬀerent between
exploiting its captive consumers and discouraging search (i.e., charging pm(c) or ρ).
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Proposition 8. If β < 1− sv , in any equilibrium of the game it holds that p∗H = v, p∗L,i = 0 for
at least two ﬁrms i ∈ {1, ..., N} in L, and all αβ ﬂexible H-consumers search and purchase in L
at price 0. If β > 1− sv , in any equilibrium it holds that p∗H = s, p∗L,i = 0 for at least two ﬁrms
i ∈ {1, ..., N} in L, and no consumers search in equilibrium.39
Proof. Since all prices in L are observed by all consumers in that market (including potentially
searching H-consumers), it is well known (see e.g. Harrington (1989)) that at least two ﬁrms in
L must price competitively in equilibrium. Thus, in every possible equilibrium, the lowest price
in L must equal marginal cost: mini(p
∗
L,i) = 0. Given that, H will either ﬁnd it optimal to price
at s and ﬁght for its ﬂexible consumers, or fully exploit its captive consumers by pricing at v.
The former gives a proﬁt of sα, whereas the latter gives a proﬁt of vα(1− β). Comparing these
two and solving for β, the proposition immediately follows.
The intuition to this result is the same as in the scenario with unit-cost heterogeneity: if and
only if there are suﬃciently few ﬂexible consumers in H, ﬁrm H prefers to fully exploit its captive
consumers and let go of its ﬂexible consumers, rather than to ﬁght for the latter by oﬀering such
a low price that makes them indiﬀerent between switching to L or purchasing directly at H.
8 Conclusion
I have analyzed a market conﬁguration in which consumers' price-search behavior is driven by
local market heterogeneities, rather than by a mass of perfectly informed consumers. In the
model, two local monopolists simultaneously set prices, where initially, each ﬁrm's price is only
observed by its local consumer base. Absent any link between the two markets, the ﬁrms would
set two diﬀerent monopoly prices, as consumers' willingness to pay is greater in one market than
the other. However, the markets are linked in the sense that a subset of consumers is ﬂexible,
allowing them to search the non-local market at strictly positive cost. Inner-city shopping across
neighborhoods, or cross-border shopping, can be thought of examples for this.
A main contribution of the paper is that a tractable model of sequential consumer search is
introduced in which search is costly for all consumers, yet prices are dispersed in equilibrium,
and active consumer search occurs. Furthermore, consumers' search activity is directed such that
only high-valuation consumers from the (on average) higher priced high-valuation market may
search the opposed discounter in the low-valuation market.
39In the borderline case where β = 1− s
v
, both types of equilibria coexist.
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A precise equilibrium characterization reveals that paradoxically, active search only takes
place in equilibrium if the fraction of ﬂexible consumers in the high-valuation market is suﬃciently
low. Otherwise, the local incumbent prefers to price aggressively and thereby discourage its
ﬂexible consumers from search.
If active search occurs, I show that the relative size of the two markets is crucial for determin-
ing the equilibrium outcome. If the mass of ﬂexible high-valuation consumers is suﬃciently large,
the discounter faces a commitment problem, as it would ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to overcharge the
incoming searchers than to serve its local consumers at a price that is acceptable to them. This
commitment problem is resolved by non-trivial mixed-strategy pricing in both local markets: the
discounter sometimes charges high prices in order to exploit incoming searchers (while at the
same time excluding its local consumer base), whereas the high-priced ﬁrm sometimes oﬀers
discounts which may beat the discounter's exploitative prices. If the market imbalance is severe
enough, the high-priced ﬁrm oﬀers a deep discount with positive probability, which altogether
discourages its local ﬂexible consumers from search.
In an extension, I show that informative advertising by the discounter, even if it fully elimi-
nates its commitment problem, tends to decrease rather than increase market performance. One
reason is that socially wasteful search activities can be induced, the other is that the discounter
may even ﬁnd it optimal to advertise a price that is higher than its local consumers' valuation.
This excludes the whole submarket deterministically and introduces signiﬁcant deadweight loss.
The model can be extended further in several dimensions. For example, it would be desirable
to allow for a more general (i.e., continuous) search-cost distribution. Preliminary calculations
have revealed that the main qualitative features of the characterized equilibrium remain intact:
active search can still only occur if not too many high-valuation consumers are tempted to
search, and also the same commitment problem is faced by the discounter as in the analyzed
model. However, the resulting mixed-strategy equilibria become more complex, and it is diﬃcult
to derive ﬁrms' equilibrium strategies explicitly.
Alternatively, the simple two-ﬁrm setup could be altered. It might be interesting to under-
stand consumers' search behavior and ﬁrms' equilibrium pricing in an arbitrary network. In such
a network, each node would represent a local submarket hosting a single ﬁrm, while each edge
would indicate the travel cost of searching consumers going from one of the connected nodes to
the other. The local submarkets could again be diﬀerentiated by consumers' valuations, ﬁrms'
unit costs, or any other factors.
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Finally, the assumption of homogenous consumer valuations within submarkets could be
relaxed. For example, consumers' valuations could be normally distributed with two diﬀerent
means across submarkets. Then, intuitively, similar equilibria as in the baseline model should be
expected. However, the analysis would have to be augmented by two additional considerations.
First, since consumers' search expenditures are sunk once they arrive at the outside market, there
is again an incentive for a perceived discounter to exploit incoming searchers. But depending on
the distribution of consumers' valuations, there might be no hard cap on the prices a discount
ﬁrm can charge while still serving its local consumers. Thus, a pure-strategy equilibrium in which
a low-priced discounter serves (part of) its own local consumers and incoming searchers may be
less likely to exist. Second, if there are ﬂexible consumers with a suﬃciently high valuation in
the discount market (as would be the case with normally distributed valuations), and if the ﬁrms
play mixed pricing-strategies due to the described commitment problem, there might also be
gains from search for consumers in the discount market. Hence, equilibria where search in both
directions takes place may emerge.
Overall, the presented framework lends itself as a ﬂexible way of modeling consumer search
across spatial structures. As such, it is hoped that fruitful and diverse future applications will
arise.
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Appendix A: Technical Proofs
Lemma 2. L-market consumers will never search in equilibrium, provided that their search costs
are bounded away from zero.
Proof. Denote the lower support bound of ﬁrm i's ∈ {L,H} pricing strategy by p
i
and the
upper support bound by pi. Without loss of generality, let pi ≤ pj . Denote the inﬁmum of the
low-valuation consumers' search costs by sL > 0.
Then it must hold that p
i
≥ vL. To see this, assume to the contrary that pi < vL. Given
this, note ﬁrst that consumers who observe a price in the range [p
i
, p
i
+ min{s, sL}] (where
p
i
+ min{s, sL} < vH by our assumption of pi < vL and the general parameter restriction of
vL + s < vH) will never ﬁnd it optimal to search. This is because at best, they can hope to
40
ﬁnd a price of p
i
, implying a price reduction of at most min{s, sL}, which does not exceed their
search cost. Hence, instead of pricing at or slightly above p
i
, ﬁrm i could proﬁtably deviate by
transferring all of this probability mass to p
i
+ min{s, sL} (if pi + min{s, sL} ≤ vL) or vL (if
p
i
+ min{s, sL} > vL), as doing so does not decrease its demand. Hence, pi < vL cannot be part
of an equilibrium.
But since it is now established that p
i
≥ vL, it can never be proﬁtable to search for L-market
consumers, as the expected surplus of doing so is negative due to their strictly positive search
cost.
Proof of Proposition 3. (Existence) In order for the proposed strategy-combination to form an
equilibrium, it is necessary that each price that is sampled by the ﬁrms with positive probability
(probability density) must yield the same, maximal expected proﬁt. Furthermore, all equilibrium
objects need to be well-behaved (e.g., mass points must fall in the range [0, 1]). In what follows,
I will solve for the outlined equilibrium in a constructive manner.
For this, suppose an equilibrium exists in which H prices at vH with probability qH and
samples prices continuously from an interval [p, vH ], following a distribution function FH(.),
with probability 1−qH . At the same time, L prices at vL with probability qL and samples prices
continuously from the same interval as H, [p, vH ], following a distribution function FL(.), with
probability 1− qL. Assume moreover that qL(p− vL) > s (and thus, p > vL), which implies that
even if ﬂexible H-consumers observe the lowest (equilibrium) H-market price of p, they ﬁnd it
worthwhile to visit L just for the chance to buy at the low price vL (this condition will be veriﬁed
later in the proof). Hence, in the proposed equilibrium, H-market consumers will always visit L
initially.
Now, given the speciﬁed strategies, L's expected proﬁt when pricing at vH can be calculated
as
ΠL(vH) = vHαβqH . (6)
This results from the tie-breaking rule speciﬁed in the model setup. Given that L prices at vH ,
the ﬁrm will only sell to the searching ﬂexible H-consumers when H prices at vH as well, which
happens with probability qH .
Next, L's expected proﬁt when pricing at p is equal to
ΠL(p) = pαβ. (7)
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This follows from the fact that p always outperforms H's price, and p > vL (hence, L cannot
serve its local low-valuation consumers).
Finally, L's expected proﬁt when pricing at vL is equal to
ΠL(vL) = vL(1− α+ αβ). (8)
Clearly, if L prices at vL, it deterministically serves the searching H-market consumers (as vL
outperforms any of H's prices), as well as its own low-valuation consumers.
Solving ΠL(vH)
!
= ΠL(vL) and ΠL(p)
!
= ΠL(vL) immediately gives rise to the equilibrium
conditions
q∗H =
vL(1− α+ αβ)
vHαβ
(9)
and
p =
vL(1− α+ αβ)
αβ
. (10)
While clearly q∗H > 0 and p > vL, it remains to check whether q
∗
H < 1 and p < vH . As both
of these conditions follow directly from α > α(β), q∗H and p are well-behaved.
Turning to H, the ﬁrm's expected proﬁt when pricing at vH is given by
ΠH(vH) = vHα(1− β). (11)
This is because if H prices at the highest possible price vH , its ﬂexible consumers will search
and ﬁnd a lower price with certainty. Hence, H can only sell to its captive consumers.
On the other hand, if H prices at p, its expected proﬁt is given by
ΠH(p) = pα(1− βqL). (12)
This is because if H prices at p, all ﬂexible H-consumers will search initially. However, they will
return to H unless L prices at vL (as otherwise, L certainly charges a higher price than p), which
happens with probably qL.
Solving ΠH(vH)
!
= ΠH(p) and inserting p from equation (10) leads to the next equilibrium
condition of
q∗L =
1
β
− vHα(1− β)
vL(1− α+ αβ) . (13)
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Note that it is again the case that q∗L < 1 follows immediately from α > α(β). In order to
show that q∗L > 0, note ﬁrst that q
∗
L is strictly decreasing in α. Hence, as Proposition 3 requires
that α ≤ α(β) = vL
(1−β)
{
vL+
vHβ[vH (1−β)−vL]
vH (1−β)−vL−βs
} , q∗L is bounded below by
1
β
− vH(1− β)
vL
(
1
α − 1 + β
) ∣∣∣∣∣
α=α(β)
.
Simplifying this expression in a straightforward manner, it follows that q∗L ≥ svH(1−β)−vL , which
is clearly positive due to β < β. Hence, q∗L is well-behaved.
In order to solve for the equilibrium distribution functions FL(.) and FH(.), one now simply
needs to calculate the ﬁrms' expected proﬁts when setting an arbitrary price in the interval
(p, vH), and set this equal to their equilibrium proﬁt levels which were already found via equations
(8) and (11).
For L, this equilibrium condition is given by
ΠL(p) = pαβ[q
∗
H + (1− q∗H)(1− FH(p))] != vL(1− α+ αβ). (14)
The rationale behind equation (14) is straightforward: L's expected proﬁt when charging some
price p ∈ (p, vH) is given by this price times the mass of searching H-consumers αβ times the
probability that these consumers will buy at L (after ﬁnding out that p is lower than pH), which
is q∗H + (1 − q∗H)(1 − FH(p)). For any price p ∈ (p, vH), this expected proﬁt has to be equal to
L's candidate equilibrium proﬁt of vL(1− α+ αβ).
Inserting q∗H from equation (9) and solving for FH(p) yields
FH(p) = 1− vL(1− α+ αβ)
vHαβ − vL(1− α+ αβ) (vH/p− 1) . (15)
It is easy to check that FH(p) = 0 and FH(vH) = 1. Moreover, since vHαβ− vL(1−α+αβ) > 0
because of α > α(β), it is obvious that FH(p) is strictly increasing in p. Hence, FH(.) is well-
behaved.
On the other hand, the equilibrium condition for H is given by
ΠH(p) = pα[1− β(q∗L + (1− q∗L)FL(p))] != vHα(1− β). (16)
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The rationale behind equation (16) is as follows: H's expected proﬁt when charging some price
p ∈ (p, vH) is given by this price times the expected mass of H-consumers who do not switch
to L. There are αβ ﬂexible H-consumers who search, but they will only purchase on the way
at L with probability q∗L + (1− q∗L)FL(p) (as with the remaining probability, L charges a higher
price than H and the consumers return). Hence, the expected mass of consumers who leave H is
αβ(q∗L+(1−q∗L)FL(p)), implying that α−αβ(q∗L+(1−q∗L)FL(p)) = α[1−β(q∗L+(1−q∗L)FL(p))]
consumers will stay at H in expectation, given p. For any price p ∈ (p, vH), H's expected proﬁt
has to be equal to H's candidate equilibrium proﬁt level of vHα(1− β).
Inserting q∗L from equation (13) and solving for FL(p), it turns out that
FL(p) = FH(p). (17)
Hence, also FL(.) is well-behaved.
It still needs to be veriﬁed that the ﬂexible H-consumers will always search initially, i.e.,
q∗L(p − vL) > s. As it is known that q∗L ≥ svH(1−β)−vL due to α ≤ α(β), the above inequality is
certainly fulﬁlled if svH(1−β)−vL
(
p− vL
)
> s, which implies vL(1−α+αβ)αβ > vH(1 − β). Because
the LHS of this inequality strictly decreases in α, it is straightforward to show that this is indeed
the case if α ≤ α(β), and β < β.
One also has to prove that none of the ﬁrms has an incentive to deviate and charge a price
outside of their speciﬁed range. To see that this is the case, note ﬁrst that pricing above vH
can never be optimal, as this leads all consumers to drop out of the market and implies zero
proﬁts. Moreover, given H's strategy, pricing below vL or pricing strictly between vL and p can
never be a proﬁtable deviation for L. This is because for both pL < vL and pL ∈ (vL, p), L can
increase its price to vL (respectively, p) without losing any demand. A similar logic prevents
H from pricing below p, however there is one exception. Namely, H could price at the ﬂexible
consumers' reservation price ρ, where ρ < p solves q∗L(ρ − vL) = s, and prevent all ﬂexible H-
consumers from engaging in search (implying a maximal deviation proﬁt of ρα). This deviation
is not proﬁtable if and only if
ρα ≤ vHα(1− β),
which implies
vL +
s
q∗L
− vH(1− β) ≤ 0. (18)
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Using the previous observation that α ≤ α(β) implies q∗L ≥ svH(1−β)−vL , it is easy to prove that
the above inequality is satisﬁed.
Lastly, it remains to show that α(β) ∈ (α(β), 1) whenever β < β, as claimed by the proposi-
tion. For α(β) = vL
(1−β)
{
vL+
vHβ[vH (1−β)−vL]
vH (1−β)−vL−βs
} > vLβ(vH−vL)+vL = α(β), a straightforward manipu-
lation shows that this is indeed the case (for β < β). On the other hand, the inequality α(β) < 1
can be reduced to [(1− β)vH − vL]2 + vLβs > 0 if β > 0, which is always satisﬁed. For β = 0,
it holds that α(β) = 1.
All in all, the proposed strategy combination thus forms an equilibrium if β < β and α ∈
(α(β), α(β)], where α(β) ∈ (α(β), 1). This concludes the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4. (Existence) Again, in order for the proposed strategy-combination to
form an equilibrium, it is necessary that each price that is sampled by the ﬁrms with positive
probability (probability density) must yield the same, maximal expected proﬁt. Furthermore, all
equilibrium objects need to be well-behaved (e.g., mass points must fall in the range [0, 1]). As
in the proof of Proposition 3, I will solve for the outlined equilibrium in a constructive manner.
For this, suppose an equilibrium exists in which H prices at vH with probability qH,vH ,
charges some lower price ρ < vH with probability qH,ρ, and samples prices continuously from
an interval [p, vH ], following a distribution function GH(.), with probability 1 − qH,vH − qH,ρ.
Assume moreover that p > ρ (this will be veriﬁed after solving for these equilibrium objects). At
the same time, L prices at vL with probability qL,vL and samples prices continuously from the
same interval as H, [p, vH ], following a distribution function GL(.), with probability 1− qL,vL .40
Furthermore, assume that qL,vL(p− vL) > s (hence, p > vL) and qL,vL(ρ− vL) ≤ 0. These two
conditions imply that the ﬂexible H-consumers ﬁnd it worthwhile to search even when H charges
p (the lowest price in its continuous pricing range), but not when H charges ρ.
Given the speciﬁed strategies, H's expected proﬁt when pricing at vH can be calculated to
be
ΠH(vH) = vHα(1− β). (19)
This is because if H prices at the highest possible price vH , its ﬂexible consumers will search
and ﬁnd a lower price with certainty. Hence, H can only sell to its captive consumers.
40Although L has only one mass point at vL in the equilibrium that will be speciﬁed, it is named qL,vL in order
to distinguish it from the equilibrium object q∗L of Proposition 3.
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If H prices at p, its expected proﬁt is given by
ΠH(p) = pα(1− βqL,vL). (20)
This is because if H prices at p, all ﬂexible H-consumers will search initially. However, they will
return to H unless L prices at vL (as otherwise, L certainly charges a higher price than p), which
happens with probably qL,vL .
Finally, if H prices at ρ, the ﬂexible consumers will not ﬁnd it optimal to search, and hence
all H-market consumers will purchase in H. This implies that
ΠH(ρ) = ρα (21)
Solving ΠH(vH)
!
= ΠH(ρ) immediately gives rise to the ﬁrst equilibrium condition,
ρ∗ = vH(1− β). (22)
Note next that it cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy that qL,vL(ρ− vL) < s, implying
that the ﬂexible H-consumers strictly prefer to stay at H when they face a price of pH = ρ.
This is because H could charge a slightly higher price and still deter all ﬂexible consumers from
search, implying a proﬁtable deviation. Hence, using that qL,vL(ρ − vL) != s and inserting ρ∗
from equation (22), it follows that
q∗L,vL =
s
vH(1− β)− vL . (23)
Observe that q∗L,vL ∈ (0, 1) directly follows from β < β = 1 − vL+svH . In particular, the
denominator is positive (and hence, ρ∗ > vL), as vH(1−β)− vL > 0 is equivalent to β < 1− vLvH ,
which is implied by β < β.
Inserting q∗L,vL into equation (20) and solving ΠH(p)
!
= ΠH(vH), it is furthermore possible to
solve for p. Doing so, one ﬁnds that
p =
vH(1− β) [vH(1− β)− vL]
vH(1− β)− vL − βs . (24)
It is easy to check that p > ρ∗ is satisﬁed for β < β. Thus, it is established that ρ∗ ∈ (vL, p).
While q∗L,vL(ρ
∗ − vL) ≤ s has already been shown (as q∗L,vL(ρ∗ − vL) = s), it still needs to be
proven that q∗L,vL(p− vL) > s. Of course, this is trivially the case, as p > ρ∗.
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Next, turn to ﬁrm L. Its expected proﬁt when pricing at vH is given by
ΠL(vH) = vHαβqH,vH . (25)
This is a consequence from the tie-breaking rule speciﬁed in the model setup. Given that L
prices at vH , the ﬁrm will only sell to the ﬂexible H-consumers when H prices at vH , inducing
its ﬂexible consumers to search, which happens with probability qH,vH .
L's expected proﬁt when pricing at p is equal to
ΠL(p) = pαβ(1− qH,ρ). (26)
The above is true because p always outperforms H's price, but the ﬂexible H-consumers only
search when H does not price at ρ, which has a probability of 1− qH,ρ. Moreover, since p > vL,
L cannot serve its local low-valuation consumers.
Finally, L's expected proﬁt when pricing at vL is equal to
ΠL(vL) = vL(1− α+ αβ(1− qH,ρ)). (27)
This follows the same logic as equation (26), but at the low price vL, L can also serve its local
low-valuation consumers.
Solving ΠL(p)
!
= ΠL(vL) and inserting p from equation (24), it is straightforward to establish
that
q∗H,ρ = 1−
vL(1− α)
αβ(p− vL) = 1−
vL(1− α)
αβ
(
vH(1−β)[vH(1−β)−vL]
vH(1−β)−vL−βs − vL
) < 1. (28)
Note that q∗H,ρ > 0 is equivalent to p >
vL(1−α+αβ)
αβ . As p =
vH(1−β)[vH(1−β)−vL]
vH(1−β)−vL−βs does not
depend on α while vL(1−α+αβ)αβ strictly decreases in α, the inequality is hardest to fulﬁll for the
boundary level α(β). Indeed, after a straightforward calculation, it turns out that the RHS
equals the LHS for α = α(β). Hence, for every α > α(β) (as required by the proposition), it is
in fact the case that q∗H,ρ > 0. Thus, q
∗
H,ρ is well-behaved.
Next, inserting q∗H,ρ back into equation (26) and simplifying, one can explicitly solve for L's
equilibrium proﬁt level Π∗∗∗L . It holds that
Π∗∗∗L =
pvL(1− α)
p− vL =
(1− α)(1− β)vHvL [(1− β)vH − vL]
[(1− β)vH − vL]2 + vLβs
> 0. (29)
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Using this, one can set Π∗∗∗L equal to ΠL(vH) in order to solve for q
∗
H,vH
. It is found that
q∗H,vH =
pvL(1− α)
αβvH(p− vL) =
(1− α)(1− β)vL [(1− β)vH − vL]
αβ
{
[(1− β)vH − vL]2 + vLβs
} > 0. (30)
Finally, note that q∗H,ρ + q
∗
H,vH
= 1 − vL(1−α)(vH−p)αβvH(p−vL) , which is clearly less than one. Hence,
all of the characterized mass points are well behaved.
It remains to solve for the equilibrium distribution functions GH(.) and GL(.). Start with H.
In order for H to be indiﬀerent between any price in the interval (p, vH), it has to hold that
ΠH(p) = pα[1− β(q∗L,vL + (1− q∗L,vL)GL(p))]
!
= vHα(1− β) = Π∗∗H . (31)
The logic behind equation (31) is as follows: H's expected proﬁt when charging some price
p ∈ (p, vH) is given by this price times the expected mass of H-consumers who do not switch
to L. There are αβ ﬂexible H-consumers who search, but they will only purchase on the way
at L with probability q∗L,vL + (1 − q∗L,vL)GL(p) (as with the remaining probability, L charges a
higher price than H and the consumers return). Hence, the expected mass of consumers who
leave H is αβ(q∗L,vL + (1 − q∗L,vL)GL(p)), implying that α − αβ(q∗L,vL + (1 − q∗L,vL)GL(p)) =
α[1 − β(q∗L,vL + (1 − q∗L,vL)GL(p))] consumers will stay at H in expectation, given p. For any
price p ∈ (p, vH), H's expected proﬁt has to be equal to H's candidate equilibrium proﬁt level
of vHα(1− β).
Inserting q∗L,vL from equation (23), solving for GL(p) and rearranging yields
GL(p) = 1− (1− β) [vH(1− β)− vL]
β [vH(1− β)− vL − s] (vH/p− 1) . (32)
It is easy to check that GL(p) = 0 and GL(vH) = 1. Moreover, since vH(1− β)− vL− s > 0 due
to β < β, it is obvious that GL(p) is strictly increasing in p. Hence, GL(.) is well-behaved.
Next, consider L. In order for L to be indiﬀerent between any price in the interval (p, vH), it
has to hold that
ΠL(p) = pαβ
[
q∗H,vH + (1− q∗H,vH − q∗H,ρ)(1−GH(p))
] !
= Π∗∗∗L . (33)
The rationale behind equation (33) is simple: L's expected proﬁt when charging some price
p ∈ (p, vH) is given by this price times the mass of ﬂexible H-consumers αβ times the probability
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that these consumers will search and buy at L (after ﬁnding out that p is lower than pH), which
is q∗H,vH + (1− q∗H,vH − q∗H,ρ)(1−GH(p)). For any price p ∈ (p, vH), this expected proﬁt has to
be equal to L's candidate equilibrium proﬁt of Π∗∗∗L (see equation (29) for the latter).
Inserting q∗H,vH and q
∗
H,ρ from equations (30) and (28) and solving for GH(p), after some
tedious calculation it turns out that
GH(p) = GL(p). (34)
Hence, also GH(.) is well-behaved.
Lastly, it still needs to be veriﬁed that the ﬁrms do not have an incentive to price outside
their speciﬁed ranges. Clearly, pricing above vH is not a proﬁtable deviation, as this implies zero
demand. Also, pricing below ρ∗ for H is certainly suboptimal: H can already deter its ﬂexible
consumers from leaving the market for pH = ρ
∗, so pricing lower than that is pointless. Could
H ﬁnd it worthwhile to set prices in (ρ∗, p)? The answer is no, because this does not generate
any additional demand relative to pricing at p: since pH > ρ
∗, the ﬂexible H-consumers would
still search and end up buying at L if pL = vL. For a similar reason, L cannot ﬁnd it optimal to
price in (vL, p). This is because none of the prices in this interval will lead L's local consumers
to buy, and p already beats all prices set by H which lead to search.
All in all, the proposed strategy combination thus forms an equilibrium if β < β and α ∈
(α(β), 1).
The ﬁnal claim in the proposition states that as long as α > αmin =
vHvL
v2H−(vL+s)(vH−vL)
and β
lies suﬃciently close below β, the discussed strategy-combination constitutes an equilibrium. To
see this, it suﬃces to check that α(β) = αmin. Hence, since α(β) is a well-behaved function for
all β < β, it must bend away from β (when depicted as function of β) for β < β. This implies
that for α > αmin and β suﬃciently close to β, it holds that α > α(β). See also Figure 2 for
graphical intuition. This concludes the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 7. (Existence) Consider ﬁrst the hypothetical equilibrium where p∗H = p
m(c),
p∗L = p
m(0), and the ﬂexible H-consumers always search and purchase in L. The latter is guar-
anteed by the assumption that ∆(CS) :=
∫ pm(c)
pm(0)
D(p)dp > s. Because of that, the ﬂexible
H-consumer ﬁnd it indeed worthwhile to search given the proposed prices, as their expected gain
in consumer surplus outweighs their search cost. It is moreover clear that L can have no prof-
itable deviation: as all searching consumers from H have the same downward sloping demand
schedule as the consumers in L, pricing at its monopoly price pm(0) is certainly optimal for L.
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It remains to check that H has no proﬁtable deviation. Given the proposed strategy-
combination, its proﬁt is given by Π∗H = α(1 − β)Πm(c). On the other hand, the ﬁrm's best
possible deviation is to price at the ﬂexible H-consumers reservation price ρ, where ρ solves∫ ρ
pm(0)
D(p)dp = s, and discourage them from search. This gives rise to a maximal deviation
proﬁt of Πdev∗H = α(ρ− c)D(ρ). Solving Πdev∗H ≤ Π∗H for β, this deviation is not proﬁtable if and
only if β ≤ 1− (ρ−c)D(ρ)Πm(c) .
Now, an almost identical logic also applies for the proposed equilibrium where p∗H = ρ,
p∗L = p
m(0), and no search occurs in equilibrium. L can again do no better than to charge its
monopoly price. As its price choice is unobservable by the ﬂexible H-consumers, it cannot induce
search by undercutting. On the other hand, H's best possible deviation is to ignore its ﬂexible
consumers and increase its price to pm(c) in order to maximize its proﬁt from its loyal consumer
base. This is not proﬁtable if β ≥ 1− (ρ−c)D(ρ)Πm(c) .
(Uniqueness) Note ﬁrst that L will never price above pm(0) in equilibrium. This is because
reducing its price towards pm(0) would generate a higher proﬁt per consumer, while it may
additionally win consumers that would otherwise purchase at H. Next, note that the lower
bound of H's pricing support, p
H
, must lie weakly above the lower bound of L's pricing support,
p
L
(where p
L
≤ pm(0) due to the ﬁrst observation). Otherwise, if it was the case that p
H
< p
L
,
H could proﬁtably shift up probability mass to p
L
, which would increase its proﬁt per consumer
(as p
L
≤ pm(0) < pm(c)) and certainly not lose any demand to L.
Now, if it was the case that p
L
< pm(0), L could proﬁtably shift up probability mass from
around p
L
to a slightly higher level because of the following. First, doing so would not induce any
ﬂexible L-consumers to search due to their strictly positive search cost, and p
H
≥ p
L
. Second,
the expected demand from searching H-consumers would not decrease either, as those consumers
do not search anyway for prices pH close to pL. Third, the expected proﬁt per consumer would
increase. Hence, p
L
< pm(0) cannot be part of any equilibrium, which establishes that L must
play the pure strategy of p∗L = p
m(0) in every equilibrium. It is then trivial to see that H's
(generically) unique best response is either pm(c) or ρ, depending on β.
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Appendix B: Uniqueness of Equilibria (not for publication)
In what follows, I will prove that the equilibria characterized in Propositions 1 to 4 are unique.
This is established by a sequence of claims.
(A) Pure-strategy equilibria
Claim 1. In any pure-strategy equilibrium, p∗L = vL.
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 2 as stated above in the appendix, it is known that no ﬁrm will
ever price below vL in equilibrium (as a corollary, ﬂexible L-consumers will never search). Hence,
it remains to show that p∗L > vL cannot be part of any pure-strategy equilibrium. Suppose to
the contrary that it does (and hence, that L cannot sell to its local consumers). Then clearly, it
must hold that p∗L + s < vH . Otherwise, the ﬂexible H-consumers would not even search L after
observing pH = vH , implying that L would not attract any consumers (which means L could
proﬁtably deviate to charging vL). Given a pure p
∗
L (with p
∗
L + s < vH), there is no need for H
to randomize, such that one of the following two options must maximize its proﬁt. First, if β is
suﬃciently large, H ﬁnds it optimal to price at p∗L+ s and discourage its local ﬂexible consumers
from search. But this cannot be part of an equilibrium, as L would face zero demand (and could
again proﬁtably deviate to vL). Second, if β is not that large, H ﬁnds it optimal to charge vH .
This fully exploits its local captive consumers, but due to p∗L + s < vH , the ﬂexible H-consumers
would all search and purchase at L. However, this cannot be part of an equilibrium either, as
then L would have a proﬁtable deviation by increasing its price to vH . As this is unobserved
by the ﬂexible H-consumers, they would still search L and purchase there due to the speciﬁed
tie-breaking rule. Hence, a pure-strategy equilibrium in which L charges a higher price than vL
can be ruled out.
Claim 2. There are only two possible pure-strategy equilibria. First, if and only if β ≥ β =
1− vL+svH , the pair p∗L = vL, p∗H = vL + s constitutes an equilibrium. Second, if and only if β ≤ β
and α ≤ α(β) = vLβ(vH−vL)+vL , the pair p∗L = vL, p∗H = vH constitutes an equilibrium.
Proof. From Claim 1 it is known that p∗L = vL in any pure-strategy equilibrium. Given this price
and the ﬂexible H-consumers' optimal search behavior, it is easy to check that H ﬁnds it strictly
optimal to charge vL + s if β > β, while it ﬁnds it strictly optimal to charge vH if β < β (for
β = β, H is indiﬀerent). In the ﬁrst case, since the ﬂexible H-consumers are discouraged from
search, L cannot have a proﬁtable deviation, as it already maximally exploits its local consumers.
In the second case, since vH −vL > s by assumption, all αβ ﬂexible H-consumers ﬁnd it optimal
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to search and buy at L. However, given this, L may have a proﬁtable deviation by increasing
its price to vH , driving out its local consumers, but fully exploiting the incoming searchers. It is
easy to check that this is not strictly proﬁtable for L if α ≤ α(β).
(B) Mixed-strategy equilibria
In what follows, denote the lower support bound of ﬁrm i's pricing strategy, where i ∈ {L,H},
by p
i
and the upper support bound by pi, with pi > pi.
Claim 3. p
L
= vL.
Proof. Again, from the proof of Lemma 2 as stated further above, it is known that no ﬁrm will
ever price below vL in equilibrium, and that the ﬂexible L-consumers will never search. Now,
suppose to the contrary of Claim 3 that p
L
∈ (vL, vH).41 Then the L-consumers will never buy
in equilibrium. Moreover, it has to hold that p
H
≥ min{p
L
+ s, vH}. The latter is true because
H can already guarantee to discourage its ﬂexible consumers from search for pH = pL + s, so
pricing any lower than that cannot be optimal (unless p
L
+ s > vH , in which case vH should be
played with certainty). But in turn, pricing in the interval [p
L
,min{p
L
+ s, vH}) is dominated
for L by pricing at min{p
L
+ s, vH}, which contradicts the assertion that pL can be L's lower
support bound.
Claim 4. L must have a mass point at vL.
Proof. Given p
L
= vL, it must hold that pH ≥ vL + s, where vL + s < vH by assumption. The
reason is again that H can fully discourage its ﬂexible consumers from search by charging p
L
+s,
so pricing any lower than that is pointless. In turn, any price pL > vL that L may charge in
equilibrium must satisfy pL ≥ vL+s. This implies that there is certainly a hole in L's equilibrium
price distribution over the range (vL, vL + s), which shows that L must have a mass point at vL
(without a mass point on vL, it would hold that pL ≥ vL + s, which contradicts Claim 3).
Claim 5. pH = vH .
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that pH ∈ (vL+ s, vH).42 Then there are two possibilities. First,
suppose that the ﬂexible H-consumers search if they observe pH . Then, since it must hold that
pL ≤ pH (otherwise, L would not make any sales for prices where pL > pH , implying zero proﬁts),
41Clearly, p
L
= vH cannot be part of an equilibrium, as this would never generate search from H, implying
zero proﬁts by L.
42Since p
L
= vL, it is clear that pH ≥ vL + s. For a mixed-strategy equilibrium, it also cannot hold that
p
H
= pH = vL + s (such that H plays a pure strategy), as this would induce L to play the pure strategy vL,
giving rise to a pure-strategy equilibrium. Hence pH > vL + s must hold.
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H could make a higher proﬁt by pricing at vH instead of pH , as this would not lose any additional
consumers. Hence this cannot be part of an equilibrium. Second, suppose that the ﬂexible H-
consumers do not search at pH . If they strictly prefer not to search, H would have a proﬁtable
deviation by pricing slightly higher. If the ﬂexible H-consumers are indiﬀerent between searching
and not searching for pH = pH , it follows that H should concentrate all probability mass at pH
(as it makes no sense to charge any price lower than pH if the latter already discourages the
ﬂexible H-consumers from search). That is, in the respective equilibrium, H would charge some
deterministic price p∗H ∈ (vL + s, vH), and the ﬂexible H-consumers would all stay at H (being
indiﬀerent between searching and not searching). But then, L's dominant action would be to
charge vL with full probability mass in order to maximally exploit its local consumers. In turn,
since the hypothesized p∗H is larger than vL+s, the ﬂexible H-consumers should optimally search:
a contradiction.
From now on, let p′
L
denote the lower support bound of L's pricing strategy for prices that
strictly exceed vL. Furthermore, let ρ denote the ﬂexible H consumers' reservation price, i.e. the
price which makes them indiﬀerent between visiting L and purchasing directly at H.
Claim 6. ρ ∈ (vL + s, p′L].
Proof. First, ρ > vL + s follows directly from pL = vL (see Claim 3) and the fact that L does
not put full probability mass on vL (if it did, a pure-strategy equilibrium would result). Hence,
in order to make the ﬂexible H-consumers indiﬀerent between searching L and purchasing at H,
choosing a price slightly larger than vL + s is suﬃcient for H. Second, in order to establish that
ρ ≤ p′
L
, suppose to the contrary that ρ > p′
L
. But then, the positive probability mass that L
puts in the range [p′
L
, ρ) could proﬁtably be transferred to ρ, as the ﬂexible H-consumers will
not search anyway if H samples a price that is weakly lower than ρ (hence, charging pL = ρ
already beats all the prices H may set which induce search).
Claim 7. In any mixed-strategy equilibrium, H's equilibrium proﬁt is given by Π∗∗H = vHα(1−β).
Proof. Because ρ ≤ p′
L
≤ pL ≤ vH (where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Claim 6), the ﬂexible
H-consumers will certainly search and purchase at L if H prices at vH . Hence, H's expected
proﬁt at its equilibrium upper support bound (see Claim 5) is given by vHα(1− β). This proﬁt
must obviously be achieved for any (equilibrium) price that H samples with positive probability
density (mass).
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Claim 8. H must have a mass point at vH .
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that pH = vH (as established by Claim 5), but H has no mass
point at vH . Then there exists some d > 0 such that H puts a probability mass of less than
vL(1−α)
vH
< 1 in the interval [vH−d, vH ]. This in turn implies that L will not ﬁnd it optimal at all
to sample prices pL ≥ vH − d, i.e. it must hold that pL ≤ vH − d. This is because by pricing in
that interval, L's proﬁt is bounded above by vH ∗Pr{p˜H ≥ vH − d} < vH ∗ vL(1−α)vH = vL(1−α),
where the latter proﬁt could be guaranteed if L priced at vL (since, by Lemma 2, L-consumers
will never search and leave the L-market). Because of this, also H cannot ﬁnd it optimal to put
any probability mass in the interval (vH −d, vH).43 But if H has no mass point at vH , this leads
to a contradiction, as it would then follow that pH ≤ vH − d.
Claim 9. If H samples ρ in equilibrium, it must be the case that H has a mass point at ρ, and
that there is no probability mass below ρ or immediately above ρ.
Proof. First, it is clear that H will not put any probability mass below ρ, as already pricing at
ρ ensures that all H-consumers will stay in H (recall that the L-consumers will never search H
due to Lemma 2). Moreover, since L has a mass point at vL (see Claim 4), pricing marginally
above ρ entails a discrete loss for H (since the ﬂexible H-consumers will search and ﬁnd a price
of vL with positive probability). Hence, H cannot put any probability mass immediately above
ρ. Then, the fact that H can only sample ρ directly (and not any prices very close to ρ) already
implies that H must have a mass point at ρ if ρ is sampled at all in equilibrium.
Claim 10. H cannot put any probability mass in (ρ, p′
L
).44
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that this was the case. Then any price pH in that interval would
lead to search by the ﬂexible H-consumers. However, because L will only sell to these searching
consumers if it prices at vL (due to pH < p
′
L
), H has a proﬁtable deviation to transfer all of its
probability mass in (ρ, p′
L
) to a price arbitrarily close to p′
L
.
From now on, let p′
H
denote the lower support bound of H's pricing strategy for prices that
strictly exceed ρ.
Claim 11. p′
L
= p′
H
=: p.
43As ρ ≤ p′
L
≤ pL (where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Claim 6), any price that H samples in (vH − d, vH)
would induce search by the ﬂexible H-consumers, which leads them to leave H with certainty (due to pL ≤ vH−d).
Therefore, H strictly prefers to sample vH in order to maximally exploits its captive consumers.
44Recall that ρ ≤ p′
L
due to Claim 6.
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Proof. Claim 10 already established that p′
H
≥ p′
L
. It remains to show that it cannot be the case
that p′
H
> p′
L
. To see this, suppose that the latter relation holds. But then, due to Claim 6, the
ﬂexible H consumers will always search when H does not price at ρ (if it does so at all), and
thus L could proﬁtably deviate by transferring all of its probability mass in the interval [p′
L
, p′
H
)
to p′
H
.
Claim 12. pL = pH = vH . In contrast to H, L can have no mass point at vH .
Proof. The second equality is given by Claim 5. To show the ﬁrst equality, suppose to the
contrary that pL < pH = vH . Then clearly, because ρ ≤ pL (as follows e.g. from Claim 6), H
will not ﬁnd it optimal to put any probability mass in [pL, vH), as this is strictly dominated by
pricing at vH (and at least fully exploiting its captive consumers). But in turn, it cannot be
optimal for L to sample pL, as this will only win H's ﬂexible consumers if H prices at vH . Hence,
by deviating to vH , L could unilaterally increase its proﬁt. The last claim is obvious: since H
has a mass point at vH due to Claim 8, L cannot also have a mass point at the same price. If
it did, H could choose its mass point at an  lower price and induce the ﬂexible L-consumers to
return whenever L samples vH , which would lead to a discrete increase in H's proﬁt.
Claim 13. Neither H nor L can have a mass point in [p, vH).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that H (L) does have a mass point at some price pˆ ∈ [p, vH).
Then there must exist some d > 0 such that L (H) will never ﬁnd it optimal to price in (pˆ, pˆ+d],
as L's (H's) proﬁt drops discontinuously at pˆ. But then, H (L) should not have a mass point at
pˆ in the ﬁrst place, as pricing closer to pˆ+ d would give the ﬁrm a strictly higher proﬁt.
Claim 14. If one ﬁrm puts no probability mass in some interval [a, b] ⊂ [p, vH), the other ﬁrm
cannot do so either.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that only one ﬁrm puts positive probability mass in [a, b]. But
then, it must have a mass point at b, as pricing anywhere in [a, b) gives the ﬁrm a strictly lower
expected proﬁt than pricing at b. However, this contradicts Claim 13.
Claim 15. The ﬁrms cannot have any holes in their pricing range above p.
Proof. Suppose they do. Then, examine the lowest of such holes, and denote its inﬁmum by
z > p. Clearly, as the ﬁrms can have no mass points in [p, vH) due to Claim 13, it cannot be
optimal for either ﬁrm to price at z and close below, as shifting this probability mass towards
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the top of the lowest hole yields a strictly higher expected proﬁt. In particular, this is always
possible due to Claim 14.
To sum up, the above claims establish the following. First, only two pure-strategy equilibria
exist. These are given by p∗L = vL and p
∗
H = vL + s (for β ≥ β) and p∗L = vL, p∗H = vH (for
β ≤ β and α ≤ α(β)). Second, any mixed-strategy equilibrium must satisfy the following: (i)
no ﬁrm ever prices below vL, (ii) L has a mass point on vL, (iii) H has a mass point on vH ,
(iv) if H samples the ﬂexible H-consumers' reservation price ρ, it must have a mass point on
it (and it holds that vL < ρ < p
′
L
), (v) there can be no other mass points, (vi) both L and H
spread probability mass over a common interval [p, vH ], and (vii) this interval does not contain
any holes.
It is now straightforward to check that each of the four equilibria in Propositions 1 to 4 fulﬁlls
these criteria. Moreover, it can be veriﬁed that only the speciﬁed equilibria in their respective
parameter ranges do indeed constitute equilibria.
More speciﬁcally, Proposition 1 states that whenever β > β, the unique equilibrium of the
game is such that p∗L = vL, p
∗
H = vL + s, and no consumers search. The candidate equilibria
of Propositions 2 to 4 must all fail, as in each of these, ﬁrm H's expected proﬁt is given by
vHα(1−β), which, for β > β, is strictly worse than what H could achieve by deviating to vL + s
(and thereby, discouraging its local consumers from search).
Proposition 2 states than whenever β < β and α ≤ α(β), the unique equilibrium of the
game is such that p∗L = vL and p
∗
H = vH . Clearly, the equilibrium of Proposition 1 must fail,
because for β < β, H ﬁnds discouraging its local consumers from search by pricing at vL + s to
be dominated by pricing at vH . The equilibrium of Proposition 3 must fail, for example because
α ≤ α(β) implies q∗H ≥ 1 (with strict equality for α < α(β)). The equilibrium of Proposition 4
must also fail, as α ≤ α(β) together with β < β implies that q∗H,ρ < 0.
Proposition 3 claims that there is a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium with mass points on
vH (by H) and vL (by L) if β < β and α ∈ (α(β), α(β)]. Again, the pure-strategy equilibrium
of Proposition 1 must fail because discouraging its local consumers from search by pricing at
vL + s is not proﬁtable for H when β > β. The pure-strategy equilibrium of Proposition 2 must
also fail, as α > α(β) implies that L could proﬁtably deviate from p∗L = vL to charging vH . The
equilibrium of Proposition 4 must fail, as α ≤ α(β) implies q∗H,ρ ≤ 0.
Proposition 4 says that there is a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium with mass points on
vH and ρ
∗ = vH(1 − β) (by H) and vL (by L) if β < β and α > α(β). Clearly, the equilibria
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of Propositions 1 and 2 must fail due to the same reasons as given above (in particular, the
equilibrium of Proposition 2 can be ruled out because α > α(β) implies α > α(β) for β < β).
Lastly, the equilibrium of Proposition 3 must fail because of the following. In this candidate
equilibrium, L charges vL with probability q
∗
L =
1
β − vHα(1−β)vL(1−α+αβ) , while both L and H samples
prices from an identical continuous interval [p, vH ], with p =
vL(1−α+αβ)
vHαβ
> vL. Suppose that q
∗
L is
well-behaved, such that it falls in the range (0, 1) (if this is not the case, the considered equilibrium
fails anyway). Now there are three situations to consider. In parameter constellations where
q∗L(p−vL) > s, the ﬂexible H-consumers would even ﬁnd it optimal to search L if ﬁrm H charged
its lowest equilibrium price p. A potentially proﬁtable deviation by H is then to charge a price
ρ′ < p that satisﬁes q∗L(ρ
′−vL) = s (i.e., ρ′ = sq∗L +vL), which is suﬃcient to discourage the ﬂexible
H-consumers from search. This gives H a deviation proﬁt of ρ′α =
(
s
q∗L
+ vL
)
α, compared to
the candidate equilibrium's proﬁt of vHα(1 − β). Hence, the equilibrium of Proposition 3 fails
to exist if sq∗L
+ vL > vH(1 − β). Since q∗L is strictly decreasing in α and q∗L = svH(1−β)−vL for
α = α(β), it is easy to check that this is indeed the case if α > α(β). For parameter constellations
where q∗L(p− vL) < s (such that the ﬂexible H-consumers would not want to search when facing
a price of p or slightly higher), the candidate equilibrium of Proposition 3 clearly breaks down.
This is because ﬁrm H could sample (slightly) higher prices than p without losing any demand,
implying a proﬁtable deviation. Finally, if it holds exactly that q∗L(p − vL) = s, the ﬂexible
H-consumers would not search if H charges exactly p, but they would do so for any higher price
in the ﬁrm's pricing domain. It follows that H would have a proﬁtable deviation by transferring
probability mass from close above p to p.
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